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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: Transportation of Stowaways, Drugs and Contraband by
Sea from the Maghreb region: Legal & policy aspects
Degree:

MSc

This dissertation is a study of the sensitive and complex maritime security
issues of transportation of stowaways, smuggling drugs and contraband goods by sea
from the Maghreb region. It considers the national and international contexts within
which those threats have grown and discusses the root causes and consequences of
this menace with emphasis on legal and policy aspects. This latter represents a
challenge for the Maghreb States related to strategies, decision making fostering new
reforms and proactive countermeasures. A particular focus on the notion of
“maritime crime” is offered.
An overview of the new maritime security concerns faced by the Maghreb
region and the evolution of law and policy related to these “criminal acts” is
provided with regard to the transnational scope, spectrum and continuum of maritime
crimes. Particular emphasis is given to the roles of IMO and Maghreb’s policy
makers and the usefulness of maritime security assessment tools. A brief look is
taken at the policy development in the Maghreb region and its response to the
menace. Additionally, the Danish and Swedish experiences in this context are
provided. An analysis of different security concepts and models is offered, such as
the mapping concept which was evaluated for further use by policy makers.
The concluding chapter examines the findings of the different reviews and
analyses carried out. Furthermore, it draws a number of recommendations
concerning the legal and policy aspects, potential security measures to be
implemented and the need for further studies and investigation in the subject.
KEYWORDS: Stowaway, smuggling, contraband, maritime crime, mapping
concept, security assessment tool, criminal act, spectrum, continuum, crime.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“The more laws and order are made prominent, the more thieves and robbers there will be”Lao-tzu, Chinese Taoist philosopher, 600 BC-531 BC

Potential risks to maritime adventure, such as stowaways, human trafficking,
smuggling or transportation of contraband goods by sea are threatening sea trade and
creating new concerns to the shipping industry. This phenomenon is increasing and
indicates a deep and complex problem in view of the latest records and data
published by the competent national authorities and international organizations 1 .
Even though the ISPS Code 2 has been implemented and some countries have
reinforced their legislation 3 to combat these threats, the situation has not improved in
many regions worldwide and particularly in the Maghreb 4 , leading to the necessity of
reviewing the existing policy, examining deeply the root causes and finding the most
appropriate solutions to tackle these complex issues.
Maritime crimes and illicit activities at sea 5 are still menacing port facilities
and ships, creating new risks and various unforeseen events with potentially
disastrous consequences for the maritime industry, such as containers being used by

1

See Reports on Stowaway Incidents, annual statistics for the year 2006, FAL.2/Circ.102
(January 17, 2007), International Maritime Organization (IMO), trends highlighting the increase of
stowaways incidents in certain regions for 2006,
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D17422/102.pdf>, (April 4, 2007).
2
ISPS Code means International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and SOLAS Amendments adopted
on 12 December 2002, International Maritime Organization, (London: 2003).
3
As example, U.S Homeland Security Act, (U.S), 2002, I, s.101, reinforcement of U.S legislation.
4
Ninna N. Nyberg Sørensen, Mediterranean Transit Migration, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for
International Studies, 2006,at pp.26-33, highlighted the sensitive issue on migration from the Maghreb
region. The countries in this region are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and the Western
Sahara.
5
See Steven Haines, “The Law of the Sea and Maritime Crime”, in P.A.H. Parritt, Crime at Sea, (London:
The Nautical Institute, 1996) at p.19.

1

criminals to transport all sorts of prohibited goods and/or people 6 . In addition,
stowaways, cargo crimes and smuggling have become a part of organized crime 7 or
syndicates, threatening the transportation system and supply chain, involving in
many cases transnational organized crime, because they are the highest profile and
lucrative maritime criminal activities worldwide, creating a major profit hub for them.
In this regard, various scenarios including criminals or terrorists trying to
board vessels in the same manner as stowaways or smugglers can create a serious
menace for the whole transportation chain, and have considerable impacts on safety,
security, environment and policy 8 . Disruption of trade, detention, longer delays, fines
and penalties are faced by ship owners, imposing higher costs burden on the
maritime industry and creating new needs and challenges for their governments to
address and solve these sensitive security issues. Criminalization of seafarers 9 and
State’s responsibility concerns have been raised and pushed on to the international
agenda.

Public pressure, maritime claims and governments’ protests post 9-11

event 10 , and even the implementation of ISPS Code, grew to decrease the incidents
in hot spots areas 11 , such as the Maghreb and to compel policy makers to take
adequate measures in combating these threats 12 . Maritime security is considered as
an integral part of IMO’s responsibilities. However, the international instruments
6

Chris Trelawny, “Containerized cargo security- a case for “joined up” government” , IMO News No.2,
2006 at pp.1-3.
7
Council of the E.U, “Organized Crime Report”, (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2005), at p.14.
8
Fred D. Collie, “21st century Policing-the institutionalization of Homeland Security in local enforcement
organizations”, thesis, (Monterey-USA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006), pp.47-49.
< http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA445343> , (April, 2007).
9
See Proshanto K. Mukherjee, “Criminalization and unfair treatment: The seafarer’s perspective”,
Greenwich paper, CMI, (Cape Town: Comité Maritime International (CMI), 2006), pp.1-14.
< http://www.comitemaritime.org/Capetown/pdf/11.pdf> , (May 3, 2007).
10
Means the aftermath of the tragic events of the 11 September 2001, which resulted in a dramatic shift of
the notion of “security” by introducing new security measures for the maritime industry and concerns,
assessing the risks and potential consequences faced by the international shipping community. IMO and
ILO responded proactively in considering these sensitive issues.
11
“Reinforcing the management of the European Union’s Southern Maritime Borders, considering the
necessity to develop a European model for integrated border management due to public and EU Member
States’ pressure with regard to issues on illegal migration, stowaways and asylum seekers”, Communication
733 final, (Commission of the European Communities, November 30, 2006), pp.1-13.
12
See John Morrison and Berth Crosland, “The Trafficking and smuggling of refugees: the end game in
European asylum policy?”, Research working paper No.39, (UNHCR, April 15, 2001) at p.2, emphasising
on the extra border enforcement and burden-shifting policies related to these issues.
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implemented and considered as adequate to prevent stowaways, drugs, contraband of
goods and all forms of smuggling failed to reduce the trends observed during recent
years

13

. The extent of implementation of these conventions highlighted the

difficulties in policy making and drafting legislation, to ensure an efficient
satisfactory framework to tackle all issues generated by these threats and challenges
faced by the shipping industry. Lack of uniformity and harmonization observed
worldwide for domestic law and penal regime for maritime crimes are inadequate.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the Maghreb is facing new security concerns and
challenges, which are pushing the maritime sector and trade under pressure. Hence,
Unites Nations (U.N) organizations, European Union (E.U), IMO and ILO are
reconsidering the problem of stowaways, drugs and contraband, even though
numerous conventions are already dealing with the subject. However, grey areas still
persist and there is an unresolved conflict among them, regarding a clear definition
of criminal acts and how to deal with them if they are committed on a foreign flag
state vessel in state jurisdictions. The examination of previous literature revealed that
the existing policies in the Maghreb are inadequate. There is a necessity to address
these sensitive issues not previously considered and to conduct an in-depth
International Criminal / regulatory regimes

Threats
1. Stowaways
- Refugees
- Asylum Seekers
- Economic Migrants
- Criminals
- Terrorists
- Organized crime
- Transnational
organized crime
2. Drugs
- Cannabis
- Cocaine
- Heroin, Marijuana
- Others
3. Contraband Goods
4. Smuggling weapons
- Nuclear devices
- Dirty bombs
- Others

Maritime
Industry
Ship &
Crew

Company

Stakeholders
MAGHREB REGION

Potential
consequences
-

Economic losses
Detention
Safety / security
Environment

- Policy
- Criminalization of
Seafarers
- Others

Sanctions
-

Penalties
Fines
Incarceration
Others

Domestic law / national legislation
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Figure 1:

Policy makers and the maritime sector under pressure: stormy era

13

See, IMO’s annual statistics for 200 6 and the trends for the last five years appearing in Appendix C.

3

analysis of the root causes and consequences related to the menace in the hot areas 14 .
As long lapses are present in the described system as mentioned in Figure 1, there
will be pressure on the Maghreb region and the shipping industry to ameliorate their
policies by improving the legal framework and ensuring harmonization and
uniformity of the judicial systems. However, there is little information available on
how to resolve the problem by providing adequate solutions in policy formulation.
The main aim of this dissertation is to undertake a critical review of these
issues by analysing the legal aspects, the root causes and potential consequences,
areas of problems, their impacts on legal regimes, government policies and strategies
on the basis of findings, and providing solutions for the Maghreb States and the
maritime sector with emphasis on policy proposals.
Therefore, the dissertation itself is divided into chapters as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a historical background to the subject and undertakes a
critical review of the existing literature and discusses how the revision process of all
related instruments may provide an effective and balanced way to achieve a
harmonized and unified legal framework. Chapter 3 examines in-depth the main
features of the principal international conventions and domestic laws of the Maghreb
States, and highlights areas that need improvement. Chapter 4 then focuses on state
responsibility, government policies and strategies. This discussion also examines
conflicting interests and assesses their impacts on policy making, and provides an
overview of relevant findings and proposals by setting out the social, economic and
political implications of such for the Maghreb region. In this context, the Swedish
experience 15 on the subject will also be discussed and analyzed. Finally, based on the
principal findings an overall verdict of the issue will be offered 16 .
14

See “Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe”, document prepared by Research
and Analysis Section of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (UNODC, July, 2006), at p.8.
15
Personal and electronic interviews were conducted with officials of the Swedish Maritime Administration,
customs and police.
16
The sources used for analysis in this dissertation consist of primary and secondary data, official statistics,
journal articles, survey research, academic books, and internet websites and newspapers articles.

4

CHAPTER 2
MARITIME CRIMES: EVOLUTION OF LAW AND POLICY
“Good people do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly, while bad people will find a way
around laws” - Plato, Ancient Greek Philosopher, 428 BC-348 BC

2.1

Historical background
The migration phenomenon from Africa to Asia and Europe began with our

earliest human ancestors, and the first human societies, approximately one million
years ago. People moved or migrated from one location to another, seeking a better
life, food, trade, thereby creating massive flows of people 17 . The Maghreb
countries 18 located in the northern part of Africa are an important piece of this
complex process. Due to their geographical position and coastlines boarding the
North Atlantic Ocean westward, and the Mediterranean Sea in the northern and
eastern parts, the impact of the migration flows in the region has been significant,
raising through centuries various complex forms of transnational issues, borders
claims, security concerns and tragedies 19 . The rush of people towards Europe has set
the stage for various humanitarian catastrophes, such as sea crossings ending in

17

For more information on migration in history, see IOM, “Migration & History”, the term migration is
used to describe movements of people in various situations and context, covering a wide range of
behaviours and highlighting the dilemma on the concept of migration and its definition, varying from one
jurisdiction to another, involving complex forms of flows, depending on various factors, based on social,
economical, political, and cultural considerations.<http://www.iom.int/jahia/page262.html>, (April 2, 2007).
18
The Maghreb countries are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania. The data and references
used for the purpose of this dissertation are based only on the three first named countries, and on a regional
approach concept for the general debate. See Appendix A for a map of the Maghreb.
19
Conquests, invasions, population transfers are associated with all forms of human tragedies, trafficking of
women and children, refugees, asylum seekers, stowaways, organized crime, transnational criminal
organizations, illicit activities , piracy, robbery and various others criminal offences.

5

deaths of hunger or injuries or starvation and in some cases in drowning or missing
after a failed attempt to reach a safe haven 20 .
In contrast, transportation of contraband goods and stowaways have their roots
in the earliest human societies, from the ancient Egyptian era to the Babylonian
empire, where the Hammurabi Code 21 was the first primitive code of laws,
containing an enumeration of crimes and their various settlements for common
disputes and citizens’ conduct. The “Phoenician” 22 civilization was an enterprising
maritime trading culture that spread across the Mediterranean by means of galleys
and generated revenues in the Maghreb. In the Roman law, the notion of “ius
privatum” included personal, property, civil and criminal law; judicial proceeding
was a private process, “iudicium privatum”, and crimes were private, except the most
severe ones that were prosecuted by the state 23 . However, the notion of illicit
activities at sea, maritime crimes and maritime offences evolved through the
centuries; smugglers or “contrebandiers” 24 became more diversified and fearsome.
During the 13th century, crimes and corresponding punishments were severe, when
smuggling and various forms of contraband increased 25 in England. Privateering,
piracy, organized crime, corruption, trafficking, wreck plunders and stowaways

20

Thomas Spijkerboer, “The human costs of border control”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 28
April 2007 at pp.127-139.
21
See the Hammurabi Code, c. 1780 BCE at passage 34 “If a . . . or a . . . harm the property of a captain,
injure the captain, or take away from the captain a gift presented to him by the king, then the . . …….
or . . . .shall be put to death”, it regulated also liquor traffic, false entries or claims against traveling agents,
frauds and crimes by introducing a primitive form of policing system,
<http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/MESO/CODE.HTM>,(March 22,2007).
22
See Appendix B for the impacts of the Phoenicians trade route in the Maghreb region, 1200 BC-900 BC.
23
William Turpin, “Reviewed work(s)-The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome by Olivia .F. Robinson”, The
American Historical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (June, 1997), at pp.792-793. Under Roman law, forgery of
documents and counterfeiting were punishable for falsum, but theft and smuggling were treated as private
delicts.
24
Contrebandier means smuggler in French, considered as a trafficker of goods using all means of transport.
25
See Mary Aris, “Crime and the Sea-The Maritime Dimension, Crime and Punishment a Welsh
Perspective”, (Gwynedd Archives Service, 1987) at pp. 27-33. Smuggling began when tax collectors were
appointed and poverty made it attractive. Smuggled goods were, inter alia, rum, tea, sugar, salt, coffee,
liquors, silk and alcohols. Networks were instituted regarding their sale and new types of ships were used.
Entire communities were involved. However, the government actions were proportional to the threats and
customs men, searchers and informers were used to collect duties and track down the phenomena of
smuggling contraband. Fines, penalties and deportation were enforced to reduce criminal activities
prevailing in particular areas.

6

flourished in Europe and spread worldwide, using new sea routes to colonies or
undiscovered lands. Wars and permanent economic and political instability, and the
transportation phenomenon of contraband of goods declined in Western Europe due
to free trade agreements, moral pressure, customs regulations and taxes; but
increased in other parts of the world, particularly in Asia, Africa and the new world,
where new colonies, “comptoirs” 26 became popular, and tolerated these activities for
generating new revenues. In 1509, the legend of Vasco Núňez de Balboa was born,
from stowaway to expedition leader 27 , offering new portals to adventurers. The
Maghreb countries instead faced instability and numerous conflicts, resulting in an
increase of smuggling and migration flows towards southern Europe borders or the
Middle East.
At that time, North Africa was under the Ottoman Empire without delimited
boundaries and its main activities were characterized by trade, using all means of
transportation. The Maghreb Diaspora, ruling tribes, instabilities and conflicts
diverted the smuggling activity from caravans to vessels. New portals were explored
by primitive smugglers and high skilled merchants trading on a larger scale between
Africa and European or Middle East empires around the Mediterranean Sea, where
exchanges of goods, habits and new types of contraband were reintroduced to the
region and these deeply influenced the local society. New drugs 28 appeared and their
impacts on the Maghreb population were significant. However, the tendency of
contraband focused mainly on ordinary goods, weapons and commodities. The
“Barbary Coast ” 29 , in the sixteenth century and until the nineteenth centuries was
facing numerous issues related to piracy, slave trade, contraband between the
continent and the southern part of Europe mainly, and drug culture, such as those
26

Comptoirs means trading factory; a term used by the French during the past centuries to designate
colonies downgraded to comptoirs for commercial purposes.
27
See Vasco Núñez de Balboa, Spanish conquistador, embarking as a stowaway on an expedition organized
by Martin Feranadez de Enriço. < http://encycl.opentopia.com/term/Vasco_Núñez_de_Balboa >
(April 3, 2007).
28
See UNODC, surveys in 2005 highlighting the use or trade in the Maghreb of cannabis and cocaine.
29
Also means Barbary States for some scholars; a term used by Europeans to refer to the coast regions in
North Africa. Nowadays, they consist of independent countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.
< www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0806137.html >, (May 28, 2007).
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done by “ kif ” 30 growers from the “Rif Mountains” 31 . By the end of the nineteenth
century, the Ottoman Empire had declined due to internal conflicts. From the period
of colonization to the prohibition era and until recent years, smuggling in all its
forms, illicit activities, drugs offences by sea and stowaways 32 , as well as the
increasing risk of terrorism became a major problem worldwide and in particular in
the Maghreb region, threatening sea trade and the whole maritime industry 33 .

2.2

Maritime security concerns: Bottlenecks and Snares
Acts of piracy, robbery, terrorism and smuggling, as defined in the post

September 11th environment 34 , are not new to the Maghreb States. However, new
security concerns emerged, which were not previously considered by the legislators
and the whole maritime sector, such as ships and port facilities may provide terrorists
or criminals the opportunity and ability to plot and strike targets around sensitive
areas, critical infrastructures and vulnerable points. These criminal activities, apart
from piracy and terrorism have plagued the international maritime transportation
chain well before the 9-11. In contrast, sweeping changes in security aboard ships
30

In Morocco, cannabis is known as kif, traditionally cultivated in the Rif’s area.
Mountainous region situated in the northern part of Morocco, belonging to the Gibraltar Arc, wraps
around the northern and southern sides of the Alboran Sea.
< http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9063659/Rif>, (May 28, 2007).
32
See FAL.2/Circ.103 regarding the Reports on Stowaways Incidents during the period from January to
April 2007, International Maritime Organization (IMO), London: IMO, (April 24, 2007) at pp.1-24 and
MSC.3/Circ.12, “Unsafe Practices associated with the Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea”,
International Maritime Organization (IMO), London: IMO, (January19, 2007) at p.22 and p.26.
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D17499/12.pdf>, (May, 2007).
Additionally, features on human trafficking as published by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), and the annual report 2007 as well as world drug reports and trends from 2000 to 2006,
illustrated the problem of cross-borders and vulnerable communities and their grips. For the Maghreb States
considered as transit countries, particular attention on Mauritania was made due to its porous borders and
lack of law enforcement agencies dealing with maritime criminal activities and offences. Also, in 2006, a
grave humanitarian problem emerged and was noted by that office with emphasis on their impacts on the
sea trade and shipping industry. See “World Drug Report 2006, volume 1: Analysis”, UNODC, (Geneva:
UNPUBH, 2006), < http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2006/wdr2006_volume1.pdf>, (June, 2007).
33
See Gillian Whittaker, “IMO aims to ease headache caused by stowaways”, Trade Winds, (March 16,
2007), at p.42. A response done by the maritime industry due to various concerns raised on the subject and
proposed to reduce delays, long procedures and added stress on masters and crews of ships in different
regions worldwide, and consequently suggested the creation of an IMO Stowaway Focal Point (SFP).
34
Supra, footnote 10 at p.2, after the 1st July 2004; new security requirements were put into force through
the implementation of ISPS Code and the development of policy strategies to tackle these issues and their
impacts on trade, legislation and public perception.
31
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and at port facilities were established when the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code) 35 was adopted by IMO in 2002 and entered into force on
1st July 2004. Ships navigating high seas and port facilities are obliged to comply
with special measures aimed at increasing defence against potential threats or
aggressions. Even though the implementation process was done successfully by the
Maghreb States 36 , the threats 37 observed and risks involved, highlighted the core of
the debate to be undertaken regarding existing laws, policies and new security
concerns, which were put into the arena and later, resulted in a paradigm shift of
security measures in this region.
Therefore, the first debate starts with the notion of maritime crime and
maritime criminal law to provide a clear picture of the topic 38 and to avoid myths or
misconceptions 39 .

2.3

The nature and threat of maritime crime
A clear understanding of what is a crime necessitates an appreciation of its

juridical nature and form. A crime is defined as a violation of criminal law, a wrong
35

The main objectives of ISPS Code are “to establish an international security framework to detect security
threats and take all necessary protective measures by fixing clear roles and responsibilities for governments,
industry and the personnel involved, ensuring early and efficient collection and exchange of security
information, providing methodology for security assessments and finally ensuring confidence between
nations that security is in force”, IMO, International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and SOLAS
Amendments adopted on 12 December 2002, 2003 ed., London: IMO, at p.6.
36
The Maghreb States notified and reported to IMO on the different steps undertaken to ensure an efficient
and effective implantation of ISPS Code. See Annex J for the status of Conventions regarding these
countries.
37
See, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Migration Initiatives Appeal 2007, report, Geneva:
IOM, (January, 2007), at pp.23-26, massive sub-Saharan population displaced and transiting through this
region to get free passage to Europe, organized crime issues, drugs and terrorism are the main threats faced
by the coastal states in the Maghreb; Mediterranean side and Atlantic side are at risks regarding the latest
publications on the issue. See, UNODC Annual Report 2007 and Europol, EU Organized Crime Threat
Assessment, (OCTA). <http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/OCTA/OCTA2006.pdf>, (May, 2007).
38
The general public or an unadvised reader may be confused by the notions of crime, offences, illegal
activities at sea and maritime criminal law. The media often present these subjects from different angles,
where romanticism and sensation take over reality.
39
The understanding of crime and the criminal system of a country are primordial to avoid “myths” or false
“perceptions” by the public. Myths are beliefs based on emotion rather than analysis of the subject, whereas,
misconception is a failure to understand correctly or to misinterpret a notion on a particular topic.
<http://www.answers.com/perceptions>, (June, 2007).
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which the government deems injurious to the public and prosecutable in a criminal
proceeding 40 . Similarly, another definition stipulates that it is “an act or the
commission of an act that is forbidden or the omission of a duty that is commanded
by a public law and that makes the offender liable to punishment by that law” 41 .
Therefore, a crime is considered as an illegal act that threatens the security and good
order of society. The use of law regulates human behavior. In this respect the
criminal law is the body dealing with crimes and their punishment according to the
law in existence that makes it so, constituting an effort to deter others from
misbehaving and ensuring equity and fairness in the society. Beccaria

42

argued “that

laws should be clear in defining crimes so that judges do not interpret the law, but
only decide whether a law has been broken”. This highlights the importance of the
relationship between crimes and punishments, implying a fair and recognized
criminal justice system acceptable by the society to fix clear lines between the
offender and the public. The links between the notion of crime and criminal law are
found in two ancient principles; “nullum crimen sine poena” and “nulla poena sine
lege”.
The sources and theory of international criminal law can be found in both
convention and non-convention regimes, such as treaties, national legislation or texts
prepared by the Comité Maritime International (CMI).The sources of international
criminal law are conventions, customs, general principles of law of civilized Nations,
judicial decisions and writings of publicists 43 . Maritime crime might be defined as a
criminal offence linked to the sea or ships, because it concerns only crimes at sea or
on board ships, involving complex issues on jurisdiction, rights and obligations of
40

A crime in the widest sense is an act that violates the law. In a narrow sense, it is a violation of criminal
law, involving behavior that breaks the criminal law and is liable to public prosecution and punishment.
41
See definition of crime, < http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/crime>, (April 6, 2007).
42
Cesare Beccaria is an Italian criminologist who wrote an essay on “Crimes and Punishment” in 1764 and
stated that a punishment quickly follows a crime. The two ideas of crime and punishment will be associated
in a person’s mind. Also, he gave the first proportion between crimes and punishment, such as those related
to smuggling, attempted crimes and how to prevent them by introducing the notion of education and pardon.
43
See Cherif M. Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, 2nd edition, Crimes, V.I (New York: Transnational
Publishers Inc., 1999) at p.11 and p.31.The sources of international law are stipulated in Article 38(1) of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute. It is the core document of international criminal law nowadays.
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States and their enforcement regimes 44 . However, crimes committed on shore rest
with coastal or port state jurisdiction. Numerous criminal activities fall within this
definition and form a breach of law and disciplines at sea, such as piracy, terrorism,
drug trafficking, stowaways, maritime fraud 45 , theft, human smuggling, sabotage,
transport of slaves, smuggling contraband, illegal fishing and marine environmental
offences 46 .
An important point to be highlighted is that there is a difference between
crimes and offences both of which fall under the penal regime, depending on the
degree of severity of the offence. Criminal offences are more severe than regulatory
offences; the sanctions depend on the standard tolerable by the society, and on the
spectrum of mens rea. The intent to cause a damage or acting recklessness and with
the knowledge of that act could damage, fall both under the regime of criminal
offences 47 .
Maritime crime is often transnational by nature, involving one or more
jurisdictions and revealing the complex issues on diverse sources, which may come
into the picture regarding laws, codes, rules and regulations pertaining to criminal
activities at sea. The controversy is that various conventions deal with or tackle the
same subject from different angles, leading in most cases to different approaches
regarding liability regimes and sanctions for a similar case. The lack of uniformity
and harmonization of procedures related to maritime crimes have generated new
debates and needs at national and international levels. However, crimes are only

44

See Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., London: Stevens & Sons, 1983 at pp.936-937.
The dimensions of international maritime crime , regarding documentary fraud in international trade as
mentioned by Eric Ellen in Martin Gill (ed.), Issues in maritime crime; mayhem at sea, Leicester:
Perpetuity Press,1995, at pp.4-10, Also described by Eric Ellen and Donald Campbell, International
Maritime Fraud, London: Sweet & Maxwell,1981 at p.24 regarding classification of maritime crimes.
46
See the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, SUA convention 88, as amended for the provisions related to the offences and the measures to
be taken to establish jurisdiction, also other relevant international instruments such as UN treaties, IMO
conventions, IOM and UNODC for conventions on maritime crimes, jurisdictional issues etc.
47
Mens rea in Latin means guilty mind. As pointed out by Professor Mukherjee, the general rule applicable
to criminal cases is “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”, in “Criminalization and unfair treatment: the
seafarer’s perspective, paper presented in seminar”, Capetown: CMI, 2006, at pp.1-13.
< http://www.cmi2006capetown.info/presentations/Mukherjee.doc>, (June10, 2007).
45
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identified by the international framework and the States have only the obligation to
establish a penal regime or mechanism in their laws to be in conformity with the
requirements specified in it. Lack of specifications on what penal requirements
should be, are observed in the maritime sector. Therefore, in different jurisdictions,
various forms of liabilities and sanctions are found, regarding maritime crimes and
related offences 48 . These problems can be solved for states lacking procedures of
enforcement and having difficulties to “transform appropriately an international
legislation into national legislation, by using adequate implementation methodologies,
based on monistic or dualistic approach” 49 . Another aspect regarding the subject of
maritime crimes which needs to be addressed is the notion of transnational and
international crimes and the related jurisdictional issues on how a State can exercise
its criminal jurisdiction to events or incidents happening within its territories 50 .
Complex solutions to jurisdictional issues are available for consideration. One
famous case on the subject is the Wildenhus’s Case 51 . Also, a lot of differences exist
between States regarding the use of general principles on which they may base
jurisdiction over crimes according to their domestic law and ratified treaties.
Illicit activities at sea, mainly onboard ships have always been a struggle for
policy makers regarding law enforcement related to cargo theft, the growing risk of
stowaways smuggled in containers or hidden in vessels, smuggling of prohibited
48

See Jayant Abhyankar, “Maritime Crime” in Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in
Maritime Security, Malmö: World Maritime University, 2005 at pp.201-243.
49
Proshanto K. Mukherjee, “Transformation of conventions into national legislation: piracy and
suppression of unlawful acts” in Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maximo Q. Mejia Jr., Gotthard M.Gauci (ed.),
Maritime Violence and other Security Issues at Sea, Malmö: World Maritime University, 2005 at pp.71-75.
50
John Liljedahl, “Transnational and international crimes: jurisdictional issues”, in Proshanto K.
Mukherjee, Maximo Q. Mejia Jr., Gotthard M.Gauci (ed.), Maritime Violence and other Security Issues at
Sea, Malmö: World Maritime University, 2005 at p.115.
51
Wildenhus’s Case, 120.U.S.1 (1887), Wildenhus and Fijens were Belgian sailors aboard a Belgian
steamship anchored in the port of Jersey City, New Jersey. In a fight below decks, Wildenhus stabbed and
killed Fijens. The Jersey City police learned about this incident and arrested Wildenhus. Several Belgian
crew members witnessed this incident and were placed in the port jail as witnesses for the proceedings
against Wildenhus. The treaty between Belgium and the US ceded "primary" jurisdiction over onboard
crimes to the respective flag States to which the vessels were registered. This foreign official was acting on
behalf of Belgium, referring to himself as the "petitioner." The issue was whether the port tranquility
doctrine should be applied to deprive the flag State (Belgium) of its primary jurisdiction under the treaty.
<http://www.vlex.us/caselaw/U-S-Supreme-Court/Wildenhus%2527s-Case-120-U-S-1-1887/210020064425%2C01.html>, (April 7, 2007).
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devices , contraband of goods and trafficking of human beings , the involvement of
organised criminal groups and transnational issues, creating huge debate on what
constitutes maritime crime, criminal offence, regulatory offence and their
punishments according to the law and society interests. Consequently, as described in
Figure 2, the risks generated by the offence, the nature and form of the maritime
crime and their punishments (sanctions) are closely related, and move gradually in
time and space with regard to threats involved, depending on each particular feature
of the studied case. Also, the perception and the notion of maritime crime may vary
from one jurisdiction to another, from country to country or region to region, creating
the urgent need for reforms, cooperation in drafting legislation or instigating states to
find a new way, based on a common agreement under the umbrella of IMO with the
participation and assistance of CMI 52 to tackle these sensitive issues on a fixed
agenda. Hence, the results and consequences could be beneficial for developing
countries and may lead to the creation of a new Code on maritime crimes, which may
be accepted by the whole maritime community for ensuring harmonisation of
procedures and unification of rules at all levels in any contracting state or region
worldwide. The sanctions are subject to the nature and form of the crime as
mentioned in Figure 2. Policy makers may use it for drafting legislation.

Figure 2:

Maritime crimes and their punishments: Threats & Consequences

52

The CMI is involved with the issue of maritime crime and is cooperating with the Legal Committee of
IMO in drafting model national law dealing with the problem of criminal acts committed on board foreign
flag ships. Also, it is considering the issues on maritime violent acts and their impacts on legislation. The
CMI stated that “It is vital that a distinction be made between a maritime crime and an inadvertent act
leading to a catastrophic result”. Harsh criminal sanctions against seafarers are threatening the sea trade and
the whole shipping industry leading to a shortage of crews.
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The second point to be introduced and discussed in this debate is related to
the spectrum of violent maritime acts in order to cast light on the topical issues.

2.3.1 The Spectrum of violent maritime acts
Figure 3 illustrates, on the one hand, the less violent maritime crimes and
offences, such as fraud, human trafficking, smuggling, contraband, stowaways,
illegal migrants, theft, narcotic drugs smuggling, wreck plundering, illegal fishing
and offences against the environment; and highly or more violent maritime acts, such
as piracy, armed robbery, sabotage, hijacking with ransom, hostage taking,
kidnapping and terrorism on the other hand. The debate commences where the
crimes and offences are situated on the scale chosen to classify them in a logical
order, highlighting the corresponding risks or threats and the adequate
countermeasures.

Figure 3:

The spectrum of violent Maritime acts 53

This spectrum highlights the degree of the violent maritime act and related
risks or threats, and by analogy the reader can easily deduce the scale of
countermeasures needed to mitigate or to reduce the potential consequences. Hence,
53

This figure has been inspired by MLAW 301, lecture handouts on “Maritime Crime & Maritime
Criminal Law, Advanced Issues in Public and Private Maritime Law” of Assistant Professor Maximo Q.
Mejia, WMU, (March 8, 2007). Risks, threats and countermeasures are easily deducted from the spectrum.
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legislators or policy makers may use it as preventive measures to be put into force as
a tool to find an acceptable way or a fair balance between maritime crimes and their
punishments, and to fix for each case the adequate mitigation procedures needed for
drafting or amending existing legislation. The incidents or events linked to the
transportation of contraband goods, drugs and stowaways could move easily from
less to more or be classed in the middle of the spectrum according to the case. For
instance, a stowaway could be an economic migrant, asylum seeker, and refugee or
in the worst case a criminal or terrorist, implying different conventions, risks, threats,
mitigation and preventive measures, resulting in various forms of punishments. This
is one of the reasons that few countries have adopted harmonized procedures or
unified rules to deal with those issues or did not ratify particular international
instruments conflicting with their interests and existing policy.
Therefore, the analysis of a sort of continuum of the nature and form of the
maritime crime or criminal offence is necessary. This continuum starts with
prevention, followed by the incident or event corresponding to a crime or criminal
offence, then followed by mitigation and ending with sanctions, fines or other
remedies depending on the case itself

Figure 4:

54

, as illustrated in Figure 4.

The Maritime crime continuum 55

54

Criminal offences and regulatory offences are different under penal law, the spectrum highlights their
location. It permits the prediction of countermeasures needed for mitigation if the preventive measures fail.
55
This figure has been inspired by MLAW 301, lecture handouts on “Penal Law, Advanced Issues in Public
and Private Maritime Law” of Professor Proshanto K. Mukherjee, WMU, (March, 2007).
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The transportation of contraband goods or the smuggling of various devices
could be simply prohibited items falling under a breach of customs provisions,
whereas human trafficking, drugs offences, criminals or terrorists may involve
various agencies or institutions at all levels, making the global picture more complex
to the legislator or policy maker. However, if as an example, nuclear devices are
smuggled on board a ship or loaded into a container to be shipped to another port
facility, the risks and consequences are not the same. The nature and form of the
crime or criminal offences are subject to different sanctions, penalties or fines
according to the case, involving different conventions, rules and regulations as they
move on the spectrum from less to more highly violent maritime acts. Therefore, a
question arises as to the potential consequences for the crew, ship and the
environment if the intention is to harm 56 . A risk assessment is needed to thoroughly
analyze their impacts and to find the most appropriate measures to be implemented 57 .
The same thinking applies for stowaways, from a normal free passage
seeker to a criminal or terrorist striving to get on board for other reasons and using
the ship as a weapon, taking hostages and attempting to strand the vessel. The
consequences are not the same and it is very difficult for the legislator or policy
maker to predict all possible scenarios and preventive measures to be implemented
in the national law or to ensure adequate and sufficient mitigation procedures are
available and in place. Here, also a move from a normal situation to a catastrophic
scenario, changes the spectrum and continuum described above.
Finally, a rational approach to the subject is necessary to find the gaps
existing in the legislation and gathering of information for policy and cost/benefit
analysis 58 . The spectrum and continuum of crimes are needed and very useful for
drafting legislation on criminal law and particularly in adopting new policy or
56

See Kenneth G. Hawkes, Maritime Security, Maryland: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989 at pp.9-15.
Supra, footnote 35 at p.9, ISPS Code fixes the security levels in terms of the threat and provides the
appropriate measures to mitigate the risks and consequences. An analogy with the spectrum and continuum
on crimes is easily done. ISPS Code Part A Section 2.1.9, 10 and 11, and Part B Section 4.8,9,10,11,12,13.
58
See David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, Policy analysis: concepts and practice, 3rd ed., (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1999), at pp.41-42 and pp.296-310.
57
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amending existing instruments 59 . Therefore, an overall appreciation on the subject
from the legal perspectives is needed to bring into light the salient features of these
international conventions, dealing with maritime crimes and enforcement regimes.
The third point to be highlighted and discussed is related to the criminal
jurisdiction under UNCLOS 82 with emphasis on the maritime zones, and
jurisdictional issues on transnational and international crimes 60 .

2.3.2 International crimes and the maritime community
Numerous crimes against international law are regulated by treaty 61 . In
many cases, they are prosecutable before international courts or tribunals, such as the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) 62 , International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) 63 and International Criminal Court (ICC) 64 . First, sovereign States have
jurisdiction over their territories allowing them to prosecute the offender and
enforcing the law. However, this process is restricted to their territorial borders.
59

See Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maritime Legislation, Malmö, World Maritime University (WMU), 2002 at
pp.74-81 regarding the drafting process, drafting instructions and the different steps involved in the process.
Also, “the language used for drafting is very important for understanding and to be understood” as
mentioned by the author.
60
Supra, footnote 43 at p.10, see p.883 and p.887, on organized crime and transnational organized crime
issues, and their differences regarding the salient elements or main characteristics of these forms of crimes
and shared features, such as that both are profit-motivated and profit-driven. The drug trafficking and abuse
phenomenon as crimes against social interests, areas of problems, the need of cooperation and new
strategies have been highlighted. The duty to prosecute or extradite the perpetrator raised complex issues on
modalities available and the effectiveness of related existing enforcement regimes.
61
See art.2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 stipulating that “ treaty” means “an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation”.
62
See art.36(2) of ICJ related to the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning the
interpretation of a treaty, any subject of international law, established facts constituting a breach of an
international obligation and the system of reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.
63
The tribunal is open to States Parties to the LOSC, 1982, according to art.291, §1 and the entities as
referred in art.305, §1(c) to (f), and as stipulated in the Statute of the tribunal in art.20, §1. The tribunal has
jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the convention, as mentioned in
LOSC, 1982, art.288, 297, 298 and under its Statute, art.21 and 22. The applicable law is stipulated in
art.293. < http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html>, (June, 2007).
64
See ICC Statute, art.5 for the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of ICC. The Rome Statute entered into
force on 1st July 2002.
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Given that States have complete legislative, executive and judicial competence
within their borders 65 , it can be implied that State parties to UNCLOS do implement
the convention effectively and their national legislation shall meet the standards as
defined in it. However, it is apparent that several disputes have arisen worldwide
regarding the application and enforcement of domestic laws related to maritime
crimes committed on board foreign flag ships while in territorial waters of a State 66 .
The case of the M/V “Saiga” 67 is an appropriate example which highlights the
difficulties generated by breaches of international law.
Secondly, it can be deduced that new challenges have come into the picture
which were not considered previously, such as the creation of an international legal
order dealing with all criminal matters, permitting an effective implementation
process and ensuring that adequate controls are in place to obtain harmonization and
unification of rules worldwide and accepted by all States. The end results could only
benefit the international community and sovereign States in providing efficient tools
to reduce claims and disputes at all levels.
Thirdly, another aspect to be considered is that a violation of international
law attributable to a State falls under the umbrella of State Responsibility 68 . The laws
governing State Responsibility and criminal law are divergent in relation to the

65

Supra, footnote 50 at p.12, see p.115. Because State sovereignty is restricted to its territory, the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction of a State’s courts is also correspondingly restricted.
66
In 1998, a joint International Working Group was established and includes in addition to the CMI,
BIMCO, ICS, INTERPOL, IGP&I, ICC-IMB, ITF, IUMI and UNOLA/DOALOS to tackle all issues on
piracy, robbery at sea, maritime violent acts and maritime crimes. They were charged with drafting a Model
National Law concerning these threats and providing effective measures to suppress the lack of uniformity
in national laws observed worldwide. Also, the Group is in charge to find appropriate solutions regarding
incidents taking place within or just outside waters under coastal State jurisdiction.
67
See ITLOS, press release 10, 14, 21 and 23 for the details and the different disputes involved, and
comments on the case. The 1st July 1999, the tribunal declared that Guinea violated the rights of Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines in arresting M/V “Saiga” and consequently the victim countries were awarded
compensation Also, it allotted compensation for the crew, confiscated cargo and the damage to the vessel.
The tribunal stated that “Guinea had used excessive force when arresting the ship”.
< http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html>, (May, 2007).
68
See International Law Commission (ILC), “Yearbook 2000 ”, Volume I, (Geneva: United Nations (UN),
2005), at pp.72-92. <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_2000_v1_e.pdf ,
(June, 2007).
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sanctions, because the legal consequences under the law of State responsibility 69
aspire only to re-establish a conflicting situation into a normal one by ensuring
conformity with the prevailing international law. In contrast, sanctions in
international criminal law are of a punitive and preventive nature 70 .
Domestic legislation is the basis for prosecution and punishment of
maritime crimes under international law. Where the crime is treaty based, States
parties are obliged to declare the offences as criminal 71 . Crimes against maritime
navigation could be assimilated in this category. The fundamental principles of the
rule of law are that criminal law must start with an enactment by a competent and
recognized body creating a criminal offence. The process is done by most countries
by enacting these laws pursuant to their Constitution and enumerating the crimes in a
Criminal Code or Penal Code or type of Statute, and disseminating the information
for publication through the appropriate diplomatic channels.
Finally, the maritime community must be aware of those instruments
regarding claims or disputes which could arise, keeping in mind that international
crimes are subject to sovereign States’ prerogatives with respect to prosecution and
punishment; they may have a potent and disruptive chain reaction on the whole
maritime sector. State responsibility is concerned with the definition, classification
and control of those crimes within its jurisdictions, according to the prevailing laws
and policies.
69

See James Crawford and Pierre Bodeau and Jacqueline Peel, “The ILC’s Draft articles on State
Responsibility: toward completion of as second reading”, The American Journal of International Law,
Vol.94, No.4, (October, 2000), at pp.660-674. < http://www.jstor.org/cgi-bin/jstor/printpage/ 00029300
/di011875/01p00047/0.pdf?backcontext=page&dowhat=Acrobat&config=jstor&userID=c3b2f7a3@mah.se
/01cc99331f00501c11e97&0.pdf >, (June, 2007).
70
See Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Law Regime,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at pp.73-74. International Criminal Law, State rights and
responsibilities come into the arena when dealing with international crimes. According to the author, the
most important actors for prosecuting international crimes are National Courts. See Rome Statute art.1,
which stipulates that “ The most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, must
not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking all appropriate measures
at national level and by enhancing international cooperation”.
71
See Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, (The Hague: T.M.C Asser Press, 2005) at
pp.34-42.
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2.3.3 The scope of transnational maritime crimes: a dilemma for policy
makers?
Nowadays, transnational organized crime 72 is a major threat to society and
trade worldwide 73 . It is an invisible cancer spreading on a large scale its symptoms,
resulting in a “complex phenomenon and manifesting itself in numerous activities,
such as, drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in firearms,
smuggling of migrants, money laundering, corruption etc.” 74 It is evident that one of
the principal illegal activities carried out by organized crime syndicates is drug
trafficking, generating enormous profit 75 . The situation is worsening with the
increase of trade and globalization. Thus, States are attempting to grapple with
these sensitive issues by seeking new remedies to counter the threats. However,
international criminals continue to cross borders of countries and violate national
sovereignties, even though many States are trying to find adequate solutions through
international and regional agreements to combat criminal activities which are a
menace to all transportation sectors, land, air or sea 76 .
Consequently, various security concerns relate to transnational crimes
emerged and legislators or policy makers have to contend with this new dilemma.
Criminal activities connected to the sea are transnational in most cases and fall under
the umbrella of maritime crimes discussed in the previous paragraphs. To further the
debate regarding transnational maritime crimes, a scrutiny of the international law on
jurisdiction concepts is necessary to address this nexus, because it provides the basis
72

See art.2 (a) regarding the definition adopted for “Organized criminal group” in the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 and its three Protocols for additional information.
73
See UNODC, “Results of a pilot survey of forty selected organized criminal groups in sixteen countries”,
Report on the Global Programme against Transnational Organized Crime, Vienna, UNODC, (September,
2002), < http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/Pilot_survey.pdf >, (June,2007).
74
Features of organized crime and objectives of UNODC to combat and countering this threat are described
on the world web site < http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized_crime.html > , (June,2007).
75
Ibid.
76
See Doug Mackinnon, “Transnational dimensions of maritime crime”, paper presented at the
Transnational Crime Conference , Australian Institute of Criminology in association with the Australian
Federal Police and Australian Customs Service held in Canberra, 9-10 March 2000, Australian Institute of
Criminology,2006, < http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/transnational/mackinnon.html>, (May.2007), at
pp.1-10. Overviews of criminal activities at sea and law enforcement practices are highlighted and some
solutions given on how to deal with the different issues involved.
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for maritime law enforcement activities and procedures. The following is an analysis
of the concept of jurisdiction 77 .
- There are three kinds of jurisdictions:
•

Legislative,

•

Executive, and

•

Judicial

- The general principles on which a State may base its jurisdiction are 78 :
•

territoriality Principle

•

nationality Principle

•

universality Principle

•

passive Personality Principle

•

protective Principle, and

•

representational Principle 79 which is relatively new.

At the national level, criminal law is confined within the State’s territory,
meaning the principle of sovereignty prevails. However, the power of national
criminal law outside its jurisdiction is limited, in relation to the different mechanisms
existing under international instruments. The territoriality principle 80 recognizes that
a State may proscribe conduct in its sovereign territory 81 . Thus, States favor
exercising jurisdiction themselves, and avoid being bound by or dependent on other
States regarding issues related to criminal matters and the State’s jurisdiction to
77

Supra, footnote 70 at p.19; see at pp.75-76 and p.101 for the “traditional” principles of jurisdiction.
Supra, footnote 50 at p.12, see at p.115. “Denmark legislation provides that a Danish citizen committing
a crime abroad, in the territory of a foreign State, only Denmark will have jurisdiction and could punish
him if the conduct is recognized as a crime in the State where this behavior took place”.
79
Ibid., see at p.117. It is mentioned that “States may have jurisdiction over offences committed abroad in
particular cases where they have chosen not to follow a request of extradition of the perpetrator to another
State. Instead of extradition it is decided to “represent” the requesting States in a prosecution of its own
where this State has no independent reason for jurisdiction to hear the case”. The advantages of this
principle are that it reduces time for prosecution and costs in case of extradition and preserve the interests
of the requiring State.
80
Ibid., see at p.116, “Subjective territoriality applies when a material element of an offence occurs within
the territory, objective territoriality applies when a significant effect of an offence impacts on the asserting
State’s territory, thus conduct outside the territory that is intended to have impact in the territory also allows
for jurisdiction”. These notions given by the author highlight the two possibilities regarding territorial
issues and their impacts on national legislation.
81
Supra, footnote 70, at p.19. A State has jurisdiction over its territory and domestic law applies.
78
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adjudicate. Every sovereign State enjoys the autonomy to deliver judgments on
matters that contain no extra State ingredients and this right comes directly from the
international law 82 . R. v Cumberworth (Adrian David) 83 .Regarding the nationality
principle 84 , two notions come into the picture. First, regarding the active personality
theory, the nationality of the offender is decisive in the granting of jurisdiction. “It
entails jurisdictions over crimes committed by a State’s nationals abroad”. 85 This
notion permits a State to prohibit and condemn the criminal conduct of its citizens in
a foreign country and highlights the effect of domestic law operating outside the
State’s territory. Secondly, the passive nationality principle is invoked in very few
cases, mainly, when a “State claims for its citizen abroad as the victim of a crime and
the accommodating State can not granted sufficient protection, security and safety or
the victim’s life is endangered” 86 . The difference between them is that the active
nationality principle concerns a perpetrator, whereas passive is related to a victim.
The protective principle can bring a solution in cases in which the violation of a
State’s interests justifies the claim for jurisdiction. It is the case when aliens commit
acts against the security or independence of a State 87 . Examples of acts falling under
crimes are hijacking, killing citizens and terrorists’ activities. These offences could
lead to the use of this principle. Also, the nationality of the perpetrator or the
territoriality principle is irrelevant in the context of this notion. The passive

82

See Conny Rijken, Trafficking in persons: prosecution from a European perspective, Hague: T.M.C
Asser Press, 2003, at pp.34-36.
83
R. v Cumberworth (Adrian David) (1989) 89 Cr. App. R. 187 Times, May 8, 1989 WL 651464.This case
highlights the notion of jurisdiction , where a foreign ship is in extraterritorial waters and an offence is
committed by a British subject on board a French ship in French waters. “The M.V. Chartres, a French
vessel, was at Dieppe with her ramp down. Youths from Sussex, including C caused fighting on board and
was arrested on arrival at Newhaven. It was submitted that the Crown Court at Lewes had no jurisdiction to
try C because the alleged offence had been committed in a foreign port when the ship was still berthed.
Held, dismissing C's appeal on this point, that (1) the ship had not been fixed to the land in Dieppe with any
degree of permanence; (2) in any event, all that was necessary for the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 s. 686(1)
to be effective to give jurisdiction was for the ship to be foreign and for C to be a British subject on board
who did not belong to that ship. (It might have been different if the ship had been dry-docked or hauled up
on to the shore)”. < http://international.westlaw.com/ > , (June, 2007).
84
Supra, footnote 82 at p.22, see at p.38.
85
Supra, footnote 50 at p.12, see at p.116.
86
Supra, footnote 82 at p.22, see at p.39.
87
Ibid., at p.39. The protection of victims of crimes abroad is vital, mainly when a State’s citizens are the
victims and the perpetrators are aliens. In such cases, State interests and practices enter the arena.
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personality principle comes into play when a “State applies its criminal law for
extraterritorial offences against its nationals as individuals also when the perpetrator
is an alien” 88 . Finally, the universality principle applies to crimes that are a menace
to the whole international community of States in such a way that all nations may
both proscribe and punish its occurrence. The nationality of the offender or the
location of the offence is irrelevant. This principle refers to crimes that are defined in
the international instruments and are criminalized and punishable according to the
legislation in force in these States. Universal jurisdiction over piracy, slavery and
war crimes falls under this category.

2.3.4

Maritime zones and criminal jurisdiction under UNCLOS 82
Maritime jurisdictions and enforcement regimes regarding the transportation

of contraband, illicit narcotics and stowaway issues are extremely complex,
particularly with regard to boundary delimitations 89 , transnational offences 90 , the
location of the offence, and the nationality of the ship associated with the event, the
nationality of the crew or offender and the nature of the offence. The exercise of
State jurisdiction 91 is related to all factors described before and varies with the type
of jurisdiction involved. Flag States exercise jurisdiction over ships flying its flag,
whereas coastal States over waters under their national jurisdiction and port States
over ships entering their internal waters 92 .

88

Supra, footnote 50 at p.12, see at p.116, “This theory is not supported much by the international
community, because it conflicts with domestic matters and has been successfully invoked only in domestic
courts”.
89
See Adel Omar Alsied, “Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries with special reference to the EEZ and the
IMO Conventions regime: A Libyan Case Study”, United Nations - The Nippon Foundation Fellow, (June,
2006), at pp.17-21. < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/
fellows_ papers/alsied_0506_libya.pdf >, (June 24, 2007).
90
Neil Boister, Transnational Criminal Law? , Vol.14, No.5, The European Journal of International Law
(EIJL, 2003), at pp.953-976. < http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/14/5/953.pdf >, (June 24, 2007).
91
See Andree Kirchner, Public International Law (VAK 06-009), Master Programme in European and
International Law, (Stockholm, 2005), at pp.1-21. < http://mlecture.uni-bremen.de/intern/ ws2005_2006 /
fb06 /vak-06-009/20051124/folien.pdf > , (June 22, 2007).” State jurisdiction is the power of a State under
international law to prescribe rules and the authority to enforce judgments made in accordance with them.”
92
See UNCLOS 82, articles 8,9(g),21(h),25,27,28,33,42,52,94(1)(2),98(1)(2),99, and 100 to 108,110, 111,
127 and 128.
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In internal waters 93 , the territoriality principle prevails. A ship remains
subject to flag State jurisdiction regardless of its location. However, by the act of
entering internal waters, a ship places itself within port State jurisdiction. In some
countries, it has complete jurisdiction, in others; it only assumes a right to
jurisdiction. The Port State may exercise jurisdiction if the offence affects the peace,
security or good order, on the request of the master or flag State and if the offence
involves a non –crew member of the vessel, such as a “stowaway” 94 .
In the territorial seas 95 , the coastal State’s criminal jurisdiction can be
extended to the outer limit of the territorial sea. Flag State jurisdiction prevails as
well as enforcement jurisdiction for offences involving stowaways, violations of
custom and immigration regulations 96 , and illicit traffic in drugs. These criminal
offences are clear reasons for intervention.
In respect of the contiguous zone, which extends beyond the territorial sea,
the enforcement of customs, fiscal and sanitary regulations are allowed, but in the
EEZ and the continental shelf, the right of hot pursuit97 is permitted, whereas in the
high seas, vessels engaged in piracy are subject to universal jurisdiction and hot
pursuit. Cooperation between States is encouraged in the suppression of illicit drug
trafficking 98 .
93

See R. R .Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed., Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1999, at pp.60-65. “Coastal States enjoy full territorial sovereignty over its internal waters, no right
of innocent passage”. However, the right of access to ports and other internal waters depends on State
practice and is often a subject of controversy when it comes to the State interests. The notion of ship in
distress is also a dilemma. If criminals are on board and human life is at risk, and the safety and security are
compromised, a ship may be refused to access or enter a port /port facilities by a coastal State for many
reasons and the customary law right of entry may be denied, even though the ship is considered in distress.
As example, terrorists or criminals are taking the crew in hostage on board a foreign vessel in coastal State
internal waters. Complex scenarios come into the picture and various unpredictable consequences may
result. See, Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon 262 U.S.100, 43 S.Ct.504 U.S. 1923, for coastal State’s jurisdiction.
94
See B.A.H. Parritt, Crime at Sea, A practical guide, London: The Nautical Institute, 1996 at p.23.
95
Supra, footnote 93; see at pp.94-100 and LOSC, articles 21,24,25,26 and 27. “The Law of the Sea
Convention provides for the enforcement of general criminal jurisdiction in some circumstances, under
article27, and the existence of general enforcement jurisdiction clearly presupposes the existence of general
legislative jurisdiction”. See United States v. Flores 289 U.S.137, 53S.Ct.580, 77 L.Ed.1086,1933 A.M.C.649.
96
Supra, footnote 50 at p.12; see p.121 and LOSC, articles 19(g) and 27.
97
See LOSC, art. 33, controls done by a coastal State in the contiguous zone and art.111,right of hot pursuit.
98
See LOSC, art. 100 to 107 and 110,111 for piracy provisions, and art.108 related to illicit drug trafficking.
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In UNCLOS 82, three categories of violent maritime criminal acts are considered:
1.

Transport of slaves, as stipulated in art.99, is prohibited and effective measures must be
implemented for prevention and punishment 99 .Also, any slave found on board a ship is
immediately free.

2.

Drug trafficking, as stipulated in art.108, is illicit and must be suppressed on the high seas;
cooperation with other States is suggested 100 .

3.

High seas piracy, as stipulated in the articles 100 to 107 and 110. 101

With respect to drug trafficking, a review of the three conventions is necessary
for assessing all the risks involved in the transportation of contraband goods or
smuggling on board ships. Also, other instruments published by UNODC 102 , related
to crimes and transnational offences associated with illicit drugs must be considered.
1.

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol 103 .

2.

Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 104 .

3.

Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 105 .

99

UNCLOS 82, in art.99 stipulates, “Every State shall take effective measures to prevent and punish the
transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that
purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship, whatever its flag, shall ipso facto be free”.
100
See UNODC , United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Drug control treaties: Single Convention on
Narcotics,1961;the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 and the Convention against the illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,1988, which are complementary international
conventions to be taken into account with UNCLOS,art.108,
< http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug_and_crime_conventions.html> , (April 5, 2007).
101
These articles deal mainly with all issues related to piracy, such as cooperation in repression of piracy on
the high seas or any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, the right of hot pursuit in case of
violation of laws and regulations of that State, and such pursuit must begin in the internal waters or
territorial seas and may extend to the high seas if the pursuit is not interrupted.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf >, (April 3, 2007).
102
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime which is mandated to assist member States in the struggle
against illicit drugs, crimes, terrorism, money laundering and corruption.
103
Ibid., see Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,
< http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf>, (March 15, 2007). “Its aim is to combat drug abuse
by coordinated international action. It limits the possession, use, and trade in, distribution, import, export,
manufacture and production of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. It combats drug
trafficking through international cooperation to deter and discourage drug traffickers”.
104
Supra, footnote100, see Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971,
< http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf >, (March 15, 2007). “The Convention establishes
an international control system for psychotropic substances. It responded to the diversification and
expansion of the spectrum of drugs of abuse and introduced controls over a number of synthetic drugs
according to their abuse potential on the one hand and their therapeutic value on the other”.
105
Supra, footnote 100; see Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, 1988, < http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf >, (March 15, 2007).
“It provides comprehensive measures against drug trafficking, provisions against money laundering,
diversion of precursor chemicals and provides for international cooperation through extradition of drug
traffickers, controlled deliveries and transfer of proceedings”.
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For stowaways, drugs and transportation of contraband goods, the review of
related issues and relevant international instruments 106 on organized crime and
transnational organized crime have highlighted the urgent needs for framing
legislation at national levels for States to tackle the core of the problems.
The fourth point to be expounded in this debate is related to the perception of
maritime crimes in the Maghreb and to identify the gaps in the existing legal
instruments needing amendments and their impacts on policy.

2.4

Maritime Crimes in the Maghreb arena: a call for reforms?

The source of law was customary law in the Maghreb until the founding of
the French colonies. Except for Islamic law which applied to matrimonial matters,
French statutory law was applied in North Africa until these three countries (Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia) became independent. However, “ijtihad”, case law in Islamic
jurisprudence is widely used in that region. For example, in Algeria after 1975,
French jurisprudence was abolished, but case law jurisprudence was re-established.
The judicial system in the Maghreb is steeped in the civil law tradition; however, it
has been considerably influenced by the Islamic legal system and has entrenched in it,
local customs and traditions. Penal Codes and Codes of Criminal Procedure are the
legal tools available to combat crimes in which are stipulated punishments or
sanctions according to the law in force 107 .
The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which is a regional body, was created to
foster a common approach to deal with shared problems and challenges. Due to
incompatible interests of the different States involved, the goal of collectively
106

See the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 and its three Protocols
for technical aspects and requirements related to the enumerated threats, such as smuggling or trafficking.
107
Algerian Maritime Code (AMC), Law No.98/05 of 25th June 1998, modifying and completing the
Ordinance No.76/80 of the 23rd October 1976, creation of the Maritime Code, maritime crimes and offences
are mentioned in art.479 to 556 of this Code.
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grappling with common threats is still in its nascent stage. Hence, the law and policy
regarding maritime crimes in those countries do not converge. This poses the biggest
challenge for combating the menace and provides compulsion for policy
responsiveness to find a balance between the different interests involved and the
appropriate legal reforms.
The four points discussed so far were designed to be precursors to the
analysis that will follow in the subsequent chapter. In sum, this chapter has
highlighted the difficulties regarding the definitions of maritime crimes 108 in
different jurisdictions 109 . It also points out weaknesses and the deficiencies in the
existing legal framework and the policy needed to combat the threat adequately. It
also highlights the divergent views of scholars on the subject 110 .

The reader will in the next chapter be exposed to an incisive analysis of the
transportation of stowaways, illicit drugs and contraband goods, followed by a
scrutiny of the various international instruments associated with the above matters. A
comparison with the domestic legislation of the Maghreb States will be made to
propose solutions for effective policy formulation and framing of legislation.

108

See the Australian Crimes at Sea Act 2000 as amended at p.11 regarding the definition of criminal act at
sea and at p.18 for the definition of maritime offence, meaning an offence against a law that applies in the
adjacent area for a State under this scheme. See also on the subject Max Q. Mejia, “Maritime
Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in defining piracy, terrorism and other acts of maritime violence”, Journal of
International Commercial law, 2(2), Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003, at pp.153-175.
109
See European University Institute (EUI), “The Relationship between “General Principles” and Custom
in International Criminal Law”, working group on international criminal law, meeting of 22 November
2006, Florence: European University Institute Law Department,2006 at pp.1-16. The group highlighted that
general principles and custom are clearly distinguished concepts in international criminal law.
110
These difficulties are caused by the differences on the perception of the concept and definition of crime
in various jurisdictions. A crime reflects both the general public’s basic concerns and public policy, and
therefore is an extremely difficult concept, because it varies according to time, place and circumstances.
Many scholars have different views on the subject and thereby create a complex debate on the notion of
maritime crime, offences and crimes. However, crime and criminal law is affected by public policy.
Therefore, policy formulation is an important matter for legislators. See also Proshanto K. Mukherjee,
“Implementation of Maritime Conventions and Legislation Development”, lecture handout MLP403,
Maritime Law & Policy course, Malmö: World Maritime University, 2007.
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CHAPTER 3
THE JUXTAPOSITION OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND MAGHREB LEGISLATORS
“An unjust law is itself a species of violence. Arrest for its breach is more so. ”“Mahatma” Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Indian Hindu nationalist leader, 1869-1948

3.1

The transportation of stowaways by sea: the Maghreb case
In view of the latest data published by IMO 111 , the problem of stowaways has

increased in the Maghreb region and is getting worse worldwide 112 . Even though the
ISPS Code has been implemented 113 , port facilities and ships continue to face this
old threat, highlighted by new concerns on human suffering, refugees, migrants and
asylum seekers, and involving complex issues, such as criminality and terrorism,
threatening the whole transportation system in the Mediterranean Sea. The

111

Supra, footnote 1 at p.1, IMO published the annual statistics for the year 2006 and highlighted 657
stowaway cases, but the analysis was based on 244 stowaway incidents, their location on board ships, the
places of embarkation and attempted disembarkation, the nationality of the offenders, the flag States of the
ships involved, type of ship and duration of embarkation, according to the reports submitted to the
Organization up to 31 December 2006. See FAL.2/Circ.102 for the previous statistics and the
FAL.2/Circ.103 for the period of January to April 2007, where 93 incidents were reported, involving 298
stowaways, 29 cases are from the Maghreb region, Morocco (18 cases ; 6,04%), Algeria (7 cases ; 2,35%),
Tunisia (4 cases ; 1,34%), for Mauritania and Libya no data are available for the cited period. See
Appendix D for the charts and different trends for the Maghreb region.
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D18743/103.pdf >, (June 20, 2007).
112
See European University Institute (EUI), The Relationship between “General Principles” and Custom”
in International Criminal Law, working group on international criminal law, meeting of 22 November
2006, Florence: European University Institute Law Department,2006 at pp.1-16. An increase of stowaways
boarding was noted for the year 2006, creating new concerns on existing enforcement regimes in different
States worldwide. A particular attention to the Maghreb’s situation was highlighted as a result of numerous
drowning cases reported to the coastal States and media, and where various attempts to reach the European
coasts ended in a human tragedy.
113
ISPS Code is in force since 1st July 2004, imposing new measures to secure the shipping activity, IMO
guidelines to assist States in the implementation efforts have been published, but the standards adopted in
many States are not harmonized and lack in effective implementation has been observed. Poor policies and
gaps in national legislation have been reported.
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resurrection of the notion of “harragas” 114 for the Maghreb inhabitants or “Boat
people” for the Europeans during the recent years in North Africa, reveals the
challenge and drama faced by these coastal States, regarding the new wave of threats,
such as young people trying to get free passage on board commercial ships or using
small boats to reach the southern parts of Europe, called by them the “fortress” and
“El Dorado” 115 . The Maghreb countries are considered transit zones for migrants
trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea, particularly in ferries trading on regular lines
or long distance carriers. However, the picture is more complicated with regard to the
phenomenon of illegal migration, because the flow of internal displaced persons
(IDPs) or undocumented migrants crossing borders and waiting in temporary zones
within countries of this region are generally grouped, then regrouped or moved
momentarily to other places without correct statistics on the number of persons
concerned 116 . All these factors affect the data on attempted stowaway or stowaway
purely as defined by the international instruments. The increased number of migrants
involved in this dangerous adventure, threatening the sea trade is the main concern of
the Maghreb States, given the fact that reports reveal that most of the policies

114

The term harraga means in Arabic getting free passage by any kind of transportation in traveling from
one place to another, using unauthorized routes and means to finalize this intended voyage. See the official
Algerian newspaper Le Soir D’Algérie (February 25, 2007), describing the nature and form of the problem
raised by these new threats, ending in numerous dead and drowned of stowaways or free passage seekers
from the East coast of Algeria or Tunisia, trying to reach Sardinia, Sicily, Isle of Lampedusa and Malta in
small boats overloaded or capsizing in bad weather. The same phenomenon is reported on the West coast of
Algeria and Morocco, but the destination is South Spain, Isles of Baleares or France. A tragedy without
witnesses and far away from the international preoccupation is still occurring and bringing its list of dead ,
<http://www.lesoirdalgerie.com/articles/2007/02/25/article.php?sid=50038&cid=2>, (June20, 2007).
115
Dreams of leaving, unemployment, social conditions and harsh environment push more and more
candidates to this deadly adventure. El Dorado is a Spanish term meaning “Golden region”. This legend
began in the 1530s, in the Andes (Colombia) and is still incrusted in the popular thinking in the ex-Spanish
colonies. Northern parts of Morocco and western parts of Algeria which were colonized by the Spanish
Empire in the past centuries and the local inhabitants have a popular believe that is strongly influenced by
this myth. Migration to find a new El Dorado is an honor for tribe members, trying to get incomes for their
relatives as long misery and unemployment is threatening the survival of their relatives. Therefore, boat
people concept or stowaways are not condemned by the local society, but is encouraged at all levels as long
as incomes and other opportunities are concerned.
116
See IOM, “Migration Initiatives Appeal 2007”, Report, (Geneva: IOM, 2007) at pp. 23-26. Also, the
reports published by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), highlighted the
dramatic issue of trafficking in human beings, smuggling and the relationship between illegal migration and
criminal networks, thus revealing poor policy in the transit and sending countries and their consequences in
the receiving States.
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regarding these matters are laissez-faire and compounded by lack of effective
countermeasures to eliminate this menace.
In this regard, the first point that would be examined in this chapter relates to
the analysis of the trends, main areas of concern, types of stowaways, root causes and
consequences, and risks involved regarding the threats.

3.1.1 The analysis of stowaway trends and migration flows
IMO reported in April 2007 117 that from January 1998 to April 2007, the total
number of stowaway incidents so far is 2,815 involving 8,593 stowaways. From
January to April 2007, the total number of stowaway incidents reported to the
Organization is 93 incidents involving 298 stowaways. This data is related to
worldwide incidents and concerns only reports emanating from member States.
However, it is important to bear in mind that this data must be viewed carefully when
analyzing the trends, because every State tries to minimize the number of incidents
and does not report the attempted stowaway cases which may bring to light other
factors not considered in previous analyses. Therefore, a pragmatic approach is
necessary in considering the findings regarding these trends.
Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO), from 2001 to April 2007
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See IMO, “Reports on Stowaway Incidents”, (January to April 2007), FAL.2 Circ.103 (24 April 2007) at
pp.1-24. <http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D18743/103.pdf>, (July 5, 2007).
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As can be seen from Figure 5, a steady decline occurred from 2000 to 2005.
This downward trend is mainly due to the implementation of the ISPS Code, which
entered into force on 1st July 2004 and amendments to the FAL Convention 118
adopted in January 2002, and entered into force in 2003. However, a gradual climb
from 2005 to July 2007 is observed, confirming the increase of stowaway cases
worldwide, particularly in certain regions, such as the Maghreb. In view of the above,
a comparative chart is given below to indicate the current trends observed in the
Maghreb region 119 .
Annual Stowaway Statistics(IMO),from 2001 to April 2007
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It can be seen from Figure 6, that from 2001 to 2005 a steady decrease
occurred, but from 2005 to 2006, there was a gradual climb. By analyzing the
different trends for the year 2007, it is projected to rise steadily. Figure 5 when
118

See the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965 as amended. Amendments
concern mainly the incorporation of standards and recommended practices on dealing with stowaways.
“These standards are internationally agreed measures which are necessary and practicable in order to
facilitate international maritime traffic and recommended practices as measures the application of which is
desirable” as mentioned by this convention. They are also found in the Resolution A.871 (20) adopted on
27 November 1997,” Guidelines on the Allocation of Responsibilities to Seek the Successful Resolution of
Stowaways Cases”, establishing basic principles to be applied in dealing with stowaways. Also, the two
circulars FAL.2Circ.50 and FAL.2.Circ.50 Rev.1 are relevant regarding this issue. They invite member
States to provide the Organization with information on stowaway’s incidents. As result of these reports
provided to IMO, quarterly reports on stowaways and statistics are done and recommendations issued.
119
See Annex E for detailed charts by Maghreb State, regarding the Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO) for
the main ports of Algeria and Morocco. These two countries have the highest number of stowaway
incidents, according to the latest data publish by the Facilitation Committee of IMO. Casablanca for
Morocco and Algiers for Algeria are the main ports presenting an increased risk with regard to stowaways.

31

compared with Figure 6 reveals the same tendency of the trends. From these graphs,
it may be concluded that the same movements are observed and after the year 2004,
even though the ISPS Code has been implemented, the general trend is upward
regarding the number of stowaway incidents and persons involved. In view of these
findings, a detailed chart by Maghreb State is given below to reveal the present
trends and to bring to light the factors contributing to this threat.
Annual Stowaway Statistics by Maghreb State(IMO),
2001- April 2007
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Annual Stowaway Statistics by Maghreb State (IMO), places of embarkation

As can be seen from Figure 7, Algeria had a dramatic increase in 2006 and
Tunisia a gradual climb for the same period. Morocco did not have a significant
change regarding the number of stowaways. It can be concluded that these three
countries in view of the different trends 120 still have a prevalence of incidents and the
menace is confirmed by the analysis of different graphs, which highlight the
occurrence in recent years. The study of these trends revealed the main ports of
concern, such as Algiers, Arzew and Skikda for Algeria, and Casablanca, Agadir and
Safi for Morocco. In Tunisia, two additional ports, Tunis and Rades ports, previously
not considered in the data of IMO, were included. The main types of ships boarded in
this region by stowaways are essentially Ro-Ro cargo ships, ferries, container ships
and general cargo ships. Recently, the use of pleasure craft, fishing vessels and other
120

See Annexes C, D, E and F for the different trends observed regarding stowaways and attempted
stowaways worldwide and from the Maghreb region.
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types of ships for the transportation of stowaways or illegal migrants by sea is
increasingly observed in the Mediterranean Sea, and particularly in the Maghreb
region. However, these categories falling out of the scope of international
instruments are contributing factors to the menace and should be considered as an
imperative by policy makers, and efforts should be exerted to tackle the phenomenon
in its totality.
The stowaways from the Maghreb region appear to target the following
destinations:
•

Europe


United Kingdom



Belgium



Italy ( In 2006 & 2007, it is the most targeted country by
stowaways)


•

France, Spain , the Netherlands and Greece

The United States and Canada
It is important to bear in mind that all findings related to the incidents linked

to stowaways 121 and the interface of that phenomenon with unsafe practices
associated with rescuing and transporting of distressed persons at sea 122 , will be
included in the analysis and how proper framing of policies should address these
issues 123 will be considered. Different types of stowaway are found at sea and
present a threat to port facilities and ships. These include refugees, economic
121

See UK P&I Club, “Theft incidents and the presence of stowaways in the port of Algiers (Algeria)”,
Bulletin 444, (December, 2005).
122
See UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2005, Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions, Geneva:
UNHCR, April 2007 at p.9 and p. 13.
123
See Selected Reference Materials; “Rescue at Sea, Maritime Interception and Stowaways”, Geneva:
UNHCR, November 2006, at pp.197-209.The mass exodus of Maghreb’s boat people generated various
concern. Also, questions of international criminal law arise where the rescue operation or assistance is
necessitated as a consequence of smuggling operations. Past practice and current challenges highlight the
need of agreements of coastal States to allow disembarkation of stowaways, asylum-seekers or refugees,
and to provide temporary refuge for them until adequate solutions are settled down. The following factors
must be considered: the impacts on smuggling and irregular movements, interception practices,
resettlement policy and the challenge of dealing with cases found not to be in need of international
protection, etc.
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migrants, illegal migrants, asylum seekers, and criminals. In the worst case scenario,
terrorists may try to access vessels in order to use them as vectors in an attack against
a specified target. By the same token, it is important to look deeply into the root
causes, which are generally related to economic, social and political factors, such as
the escape from civil unrest, religious and cultural persecution or unemployment.
Undocumented persons raise the complex issues of personal classification and the
appropriate internationally accepted mechanism in processing and handling these
cases.
The main places where stowaways hide themselves on board commercial
vessels depend on the type and size of the ships targeted 124 , and the time spent
alongside or at anchor. Ro-Ro cargo ships are the ones that are singled out the most,
followed by ferries, containerships and general cargo ships. Vessels that are
characterized by short voyages, short transit time and high speeds are the usual
targets of stowaways in the region, due to the fact that strategic information relevant
to the vessels movement are easily obtained by them. This highlights the complex
issues on vulnerabilities and risks generated by this menace. In the Maghreb, the
stowaway crisis is real; national flagged ships or foreign vessels trading in the region
are equally targeted without distinction as revealed by statistics published by IMO.
Stowaways are still getting on board ships despite various prevention measures 125
taken by shipowners and their crews. Some turn up dead, drowned, killed or are
injured by irresponsible masters 126 in their attempts to solve the problem summarily

124

Easy access, shortage of crew, few guards or reduced watch on board a ship, aim to facilitate the tasks
for potential stowaways. In getting correct information about the target, candidates to this risky adventure
deduct easily the weak points or vulnerabilities, which encourage them to decide for an attempt or an
offensive without regrets on their unlawful acts. Thus, they often forget that being a stowaway is
considered as a crime and consequently punishable in accordance with the domestic laws prevailing in this
zone. Also, stowaways often compromise the safety and security of the threatened ship and pose a danger to
the whole adventure or maritime expedition, resulting in incalculable risks and potential consequences to
him or her self, the crew, passengers, ship, cargo and environment.
125
See ISPS Code Part A, Section 7 and 14 on security measures to be adopted by ships and port facilities.
126
See the Maersk Dubai Case (1996). Three Romanian stowaways were thrown overboard in the high seas
of the North Atlantic. The Captain called them “the fish”, and sent a message in which he made the
following statement “I caught the fish”. This case highlights the real drama faced by ships and crews.
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in violation of international law on fundamental human rights 127 . These places where
stowaways hide themselves include containers, cofferdams, rudder trunks, engine
rooms, lifeboats, chain lockers, funnels, pipes, ventilation tunnels, cranes, trucks,
stores or other lockers on board ships while such vessels are in port or waiting in an
anchorage zone. In some instances, crew cabins are involved inadvertently furnishing
a basis for criminalization of seafarers 128 as accomplices to the crime. Hence,
reaffirming the notion generally accepted by the maritime community that on board
the ship there is no safe space or clean place, regarding these threats 129 .

3.1.2 Analysis of different types of stowaway and their motivation
From the Maghreb towards Europe, several categories of stowaways 130 are
identified with respect to transportation by sea.
3.1.2.1

Fortune seekers or economic migrants
In the Maghreb region, they are the most common group and are motivated

mainly by the prospect of acquiring better job opportunities and improving their
standard of living. This category is very vulnerable and is often targeted by
organized crime or criminal gangs, seeking to infiltrate them and use them for
criminal activities. This category falls under the Convention on Facilitation of
International Maritime Traffic (FAL Convention), 1965 as amended. The definition

127

See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which is the first international statement to use
the term “human rights”, and has been adopted by the Human Rights movement as a Charter, where in its
article 3 it is stipulated that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person”.
128
See Dimitri Ladischensky, “Adored, reviled, abused, loved by romantics, feared by shipowners, killed
by captains: stowaways –the myth and the reality”, Mare, No.60, February / March 2007,
< http://www.mare.de/mare/english/pdf/mare60/mare60_blindpass1.pdf >, (June, 2007) at pp.1-5. An
Algerian stowaway Choipai Ahmed was arrested on board The Hannover Express by Captain Köhns and
given later on asylum in a European country. This “Blinde passagier” caused fear and torment on board.
129
See Case Study S 006 on stowaways, Signal experiences, No space is safe, North of England P & I
Association limited, 2006, at pp.1-2. < www.nepia.com>, (June, 2007).
130
See The North of England P & I Association, “Types of stowaway”, Signals Special, No.6, March 6,
2001 at pp. 1-12. < www.nepia.com >, (June, 2007). A clear categorization of stowaways was given and a
detailed report on fines country by country, hot spot areas, preventive and remedial measures. Particular
attention was given to the African perspective and Maghreb and to Spain regarding the irregular flow of
illegal migrants by sea who drowned. The main procedures to be used as guidelines related to stowaway
cases threatening ships were explained.
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of ship or vessel is found in the respective IMO conventions 131 . The FAL Convention
gives the definition only of Cruise Ship in its Annex, Section 1.A. Furthermore, it is
critical to make a distinction between the definition of alien who entered the country
legally, but whose residential status or visa has expired, and the illegal immigrant
who has entered the foreign territory in a clandestine way and often is undocumented.
These two offences are considered as crimes 132 . The offences and punishments are
different due to the difference in gravity between the two acts. Captains on board
vessels trading in the Maghreb zone should be aware of these threats.
3.1.2.2

Refugees
The definition of a refugee is contained in the 1951 United Nations

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, which define a refugee as an individual who: “owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country.” 133 Refugees are protected and their particular status confers those rights,
roles and responsibilities according to the prevailing international instruments. Some
refugees are in some cases stowaways. This category of stowaway seeks to escape
war, persecution, civil unrest and is indicated in many reports 134 . This exposes the
131

IMO Conventions are those instruments, such as MARPOL 73/78, SOLAS 74 as amended etc.
See Brigadier B.A.H. Paritt, Stowaways by Sea, Illegal Immigrants, Refugees, Asylum Seekers, a
Nautical Institute practical guide to a growing international problem, London: Nautical Institute, 1992 at
p.44. See also refugees in Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
133
The term refugee, like the people it covers may involve a lot of ground and it is often interpreted from
different angles when it comes to the scope of application, regarding rights, roles and responsibilities
related to its legal definition. Such divergent views may create new and complex debate for legislators or
policy makers on how to tackle this issue related to the notion of refugee. This term does not apply to
stateless people, internally displaced persons (IDPs), forced migrants, economic migrants and rejected
asylum seekers as example, highlighting the necessity to frame new detailed legal definitions with regard to
this sensitive issue. Also, mass exodus or mass flight of threatened population seeking to get on board
vessels to cross the Mediterranean Sea is an important point, which should be considered by the Maghreb
legislators or policy makers to tackle this international policy issue. See Cartagena Declaration and OAU
for different definitions related to the notion of refugee.
134
See Abdel Hakim Tizegha Case, an Algerian stowaway who entered fraudulently Boston on an Algerian
LNG Tanker and was granted asylum after a series of trials, even though, he was involved indirectly in the
foiled millennium bombing plot as an associate of Ahmed Ressam. See, Janice L. Kephart, “Immigration
and Terrorism: Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorism Travel, Connections”, The Quarterly
Journal, Vol.5, No.2, Fall 2006, at p.56.
132
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related issue of fraud, undocumented persons and falsified papers etc. 135 In addition;
psychological disorders, aggressiveness and impulsiveness are observed in the
mentioned group 136 . In general, they move in pairs or groups. North African States
are very vulnerable in connection with this issue due to their porous borders and long
frontiers which need protection and impose huge costs on the affected governments.
3.1.2.3

Asylum seekers
Asylum seekers are called political refugees 137 by some scholars, because

they are linked to the social political factors prevailing in the country of origin and
this category in the Maghreb region present a real risk to commercial ships trading in
particular ports in the affected countries, specially, where internally displaced
persons or illegal immigrants from the sub-Sahara are present in a huge number.
These asylum seekers are refugees seeking asylum in Europe. In many cases,
economic migrants claimed asylum to avoid expulsion, detention or repatriation.
This category is often tempted to acquire false identification and sometimes pose as
refugees from war torn or conflict areas. They usually demonstrate violent tendencies
if they are not granted asylum readily. Masters trading in the Mediterranean Sea
should be aware of this category of stowaways 138 . However, an asylum seeker who
does meet the requirements of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees is granted the
status of refugee and protected under its Articles 31 and 33, against expulsion,
135

See “Organized illegal Immigration into the European Union”, EUROPOL Report, (The Hague: Europol,
January 2007) at pp.1-4, and Trafficking of Human Beings in the European Union, Europol Report,
(The Hague: Europol, May 2007) at pp.1-6, describing all features related to this menace.
< http://www.europol.europa.eu >, (June 2007).
136
Supra, footnote 128 at p.35; see p.1, the author stipulated that these types of stowaways tend to be
impulsive.
137
Supra, footnote 132 at p.36; see p.46-47, the author highlighted the problem of this type of stowaways,
while on board commercial vessels; they try to get granted asylum in Europe. The Maghreb region is stated
as a high risk area regarding the considered menace related to this category.
138
See Article 4, Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, fixing the conditions on granting a
nationality to a person not born in a Contracting State. Article 1, Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons, 1954, defines the term stateless person as “a person who is not considered as a national
by any State under the operation of its law”. Also, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951
shall be considered and its Protocol of 1967, fixes the conditions and definitions on refugees and gives the
different technical modalities related to the use of this international instrument. The Declaration on the
Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live, 1985, defines the
term alien and it applies “to any individual who is not a national of the State in which he or she is present,
with due regard to qualifications made in subsequent articles in this convention”.
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repatriation and penalties or other punishments in force regarding these offences.
Favorable treatments are given to refugees or asylum seekers by international
instruments, whereas in some jurisdictions immigration law 139 is more restrictive and
does not give such rights to the offender who is classed as an illegal immigrant.
Therefore, Captains must act responsibly with respect to safety and health related
matters when they encounter such category of stowaways, especially women and
children who are entitled to better protection under international law. 140

3.1.2.4

Criminals or terrorists
This category of stowaways is the most worrisome and represents a huge

concern to the shipping industry and stakeholders. Criminals linked to the organized
crime or transnational organized crime or escaping sanctions/punishments after trials
in a particular jurisdiction, absconders, deserters etc, fall all under this group of
stowaways. They are considered by experts as aggressive, violent and generally
uncooperative with the ship’s staff or authorities when found or discovered on board
a vessel while at sea, at anchor or berthed 141 . This category of stowaways is seldom
restricted to individuals, but includes gangs or groups seeking to gain access on
board commercial ships, such as ferries or containerships through the weak links
existing in the maritime security chain. These criminals operate in accordance with
criminal theories or existing networks as described by enforcement agencies, such as
Interpol or Europol. The involvement of organized crime has been often documented
and published in annual reports by official agencies or organizations working in this
field.
139

See the Tampa case, 2001 in Vadarlis v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Others
(Federal Court of Australia, V 900 of 2001). 460 Asylum seekers were held on board the vessel.
140
A particular attention shall be made by the Captains regarding the issues related to asylum seekers,
refugees and stateless people and they shall take into account all international instruments related to the
subject, such as UN Conventions, guidelines issued by UNHCR, European Asylum Convention and the
Schengen Accords or any other general practices and customs recognized by treaty law.
141
Supra, footnote 130 at p.35; see p.1, it is mentioned that this type of stowaways may be linked or related
to other illicit activities, such as contraband, narcotics trafficking or smuggling of prohibited items, etc.
these stowaways considered as criminals under international criminal law may present a serious threat to
the ship, crew and environment, menacing the whole trade in extreme cases. Particular destinations are
prevalent for such offences falling under penal law and are punished in conformity with the prevailing
domestic law of the country where the offence occurred.
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As long as the impacts of growing globalisation are not adequately addressed
by policy makers in resolving all dimensions of the problem, these risks will persist.
Hence, organized crime syndicates or transnational organized networks which are
motivated to exploit the situation through infiltration and other means would want to
get the most out of this lucrative market. Consequently, the use of organized crime
mega networks to facilitate the illegal migration trade appears to be increasing, in
view of their professionalism and organizational skills in managing groups. They are
profit-driven and have well established routes from the Maghreb region towards the
South European borders. 142 North Africa is considered as a transit point to enter the
European Union (E.U). All types of vessels are targeted by these criminals and they
often use detours which lengthens both the voyage and the route and fraught with
more risks due to new enforcement regimes adopted by the E.U. In view of the latest
Europol reports, captains, public authorities and policy makers should consider this
category of stowaways, and take appropriate steps 143 in implementing the requisite
preventive and remedial measures. All offences committed by these criminals fall
under international criminal law 144 and domestic law. In consequence, problems of
detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of maritime crimes are raised 145 ,
and the Maghreb States are directly impacted due to their geographic location as all
trafficking or smuggling routes of illegal migrants pass through the Maghreb
countries, creating huge burden on legislators and policy makers to come up with
answers to these threats.
142

Smuggling routes are principally from Morocco to Spain, whereas Algeria as a transit country offers
multiple choices to the criminal networks due to the immensity of its territory.
143
The modus operandi related to the routes used and contributor factors are prima facie elements for
investigators.
144
See Robert Cryer and Håkan Friman and Darryl Robinson and Elisabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to
International Criminal Law and Procedure, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at p.349 and
p.382. Detailed procedures of international criminal investigations and prosecutions are provided and
evidentiary rules described.
145
The main problems are related to the detection of stowaways at the port facilities or adjacent waterfronts,
revealing the lack of equipments to detect these threats, lack of information exchange between the different
agencies involved, etc. Problems of investigation and prosecution of maritime crimes , meanly regarding
the stowaway menace due to lack of trust of victims, lack of evidence, real or oral testimony, lack of
technical knowledge on how to use international cooperation tools such as formal or informal mutual legal
assistance, lack of systematic criminal procedures for taking testimony expeditiously, problems with the
punishment of the maritime crime and corruption, ineffective countermeasures against the enumerated
maritime crimes etc.

39

These criminals also represent a huge menace the ship, crew, cargo and
environment, involving various scenarios.

146

The last suicide bombings which

happened in the Maghreb highlight the nature and form of the existing threat 147 . The
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, 1988 also has relevance in this matter 148 . This convention obliges
Contracting Governments either to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders. All
Maghreb States have ratified this Convention and its Protocol. However, the 2005
SUA Convention and its Protocol is not in force and will probably take years before
entering into force, because many grey areas still persist, such as the definitions on
maritime terrorism and maritime crime.
•

Push and Pull Factors:
What are the main motivation which drives stowaways or migrants to move

from the Maghreb towards Europe and targeting all types and means of
transportation by sea? 149 From the perspective of the Maghreb region, the following
push and pull factors are observed 150 :
a. The causes and consequences of migration and stowaways flows are
social, economic, political and environmental.
146

See ISPS Code, Part B, Section 8.9 Section 15.11 for the detailed possible threats to ships and port
facilities, such as “damage to, or destruction of the ship or of a port facility, hijacking or seizure of the ship
or of persons on board, tampering with cargo, unauthorized access or use, including presence of stowaways,
smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction, use of the ship to carry those
intending to cause a security incident and /or their equipment, the use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a
mean to cause damage or destruction, attacks from seaward whilst at berth or at anchor , etc.”.
147
See Hassane Meftahi, “Suicide Bombing Kills 10 in Algeria” , The Guardian, July 11, 2007,
< http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6772444,00.html >, (July, 2007).
148
See SUA 88 which stipulates “that its main purpose is to ensure that appropriate action is taken against
persons committing unlawful acts against ships, including the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence
against persons on board ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to damage or
destroy it”. < http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=686 >, (July, 2007).
149
See Ernest George Ravenstein’s laws of migration. He was a geographer of German extraction who
worked at the Royal Geographical Society in London. In 1885, he published a paper entitled “The Laws of
Migration” in the Journal of the Statistical Society. “Any migration is as a result of push forces at the origin
and pull forces at the destination” (Push Pull Theory). < http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~tobler/publications
/pdf_docs/movement/migration/Ravenstein.pdf >, (June, 2007).
150
Supra, footnote 135 at p.37; see pp.1-4, giving the reasons that migrants leave their home countries
continues to exist and is worsening. The report described the push and pull factors for the Maghreb region.
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b. Push factors: Dissolution and disintegration of multicultural States, social
disequilibrium, religious and ethnic conflicts, natural disasters , such as
earthquakes, shortage of water, global warning and climate change,
discrimination

against

minority

groups,

political

instability,

unemployment, terrorism activities, economic situation, uncontrollable
population growth and illegal migrants issues, impoverishments, poor
government policies.
c. Pull Factors: Shortage of manpower and unsaturated labor market,
economic prosperity, employment opportunity, family reunion-Diaspora,
better health care and life expectancy, comprehensive social security,
democratic systems of government, political and social stability, historical
links, common languages and existing communities in the sending
countries as well as in the receiving States, expectations, human rights,
propaganda and ex- colonial ties, climate and attractive regions. 151
These types of stowaway are targeting ships and port facilities in the
Maghreb region because of the following reasons:
•

Easy access to port facilities and ships, complicity and corruption in the
arena

•

Fast speed ships, such as ferries and Ro-Ro cargo ships.

•

Availability and easy access to information

•

Old port configuration surrounded by human habitation – proximity of
cities and suburbs

•

Low costs and less risks involved

•

Lack of adequate security equipments to detect and deter these threats

151

These comments on push and pull factors have been inspired in analyzing newspapers from the Maghreb
and by using MLAW 301, lecture handouts on “Maritime Crime & Maritime Criminal Law, Advanced
Issues in Public and Private Maritime Law” of Assistant Professor Maximo Q. Mejia, WMU, (March 8,
2007). Illegal migration by sea, stowaways and human trafficking /smuggling, threats, types of stowaways
and push/pull factors were analyzed and described regarding worldwide trends.
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•

Poor enforcement agencies and lack of effective implementation of
international instruments into national legislation

•

Lack of effective preventive and remedial measures, inadequate sanctions
or punishments by the repressive legal system , fines and penalties are
insufficient in many cases to discourage the offenders

•

Poor enforcement regarding the punishment of offenders, overcrowded
prisons, social costs; stowaways are seldom jailed and often get free after
trials, escape prosecution, etc.

•

Organized crime or transnational organized crime networks, local gangs

•

Insufficient patrols at sea, in and around port facilities.

•

Other reasons.

3.1.3 The consequences of having stowaways on board ships
Stowaways on board can cause inter-personal problems, legal issues,
financial claims and problems for shipowners as well as State authorities when the
vessel is calling in their ports. Additionally, various costs come into the picture, such
as those related to delays, detention 152 , maintenance and repatriation. 153 IMO again
gets tough on stowaways, because this crisis and dilemma still persist and is not
going away as rapidly as it should. Carriers continue to bear the burden of fines and
other penalties and even severe punishments have not resolved the issue. The main
trends in certain regions are increasing and getting worse 154 . Many countries impose
fines under their domestic legislation for having stowaways on board the vessel at its
arrival and in case they escape from it 155 . This issue highlights the impacts on the
shipping sector, regarding financial and social costs supported by the shipowners or
152

See the German M/V Cap Anamur Case (2004). In July 2004, the crew of the vessel rescued 37 African
asylum seekers from their unseaworthy boat in the Mediterranean Sea and took them aboard. On 12 July
2004, the vessel was allowed to call in Italy. The master and crew were arrested and the ship was seized.
153
See ITF, guidelines, policy on stowaways and their treatment on board. < www.itf.org.uk >, (July, 2007).
154
See “Perplexity of the refugee crisis throws masters into deep end”, Lloyd’s List, July 9, 2007,
< www.lloydslist.com/art/1183553721373 >, (June 30, 2007). “A master who kept the stowaways battened
down below because he feared for the safety of his ship if they escaped was accused of being cavalier with their
human rights”. 20 stowaways were found and his crew was only 15 on that containership.
155

Spain imposes a fine equivalent to 160,000 US Dollars if a stowaway escapes while the ship is in its
territory. In other countries, the fines vary from 1,000 to 10,000 US Dollars according to the case.
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by the public sector 156 . Preventive measures are essential for stowaways’ threats in
the port as well as on the ship. Therefore, ships’ crew and ship operators have to
exercise due diligence regarding this menace. IMO guidelines 157 are helpful devices
to prevent and ease the resolution of conflicting cases.
The adoption of effective, fair and equitable measures are a huge challenge
for legislators in respect of enforcement regimes and the prosecution of the offenders,
because they may be in conflict with international treaties which protect the rights of
refugees and asylum seekers. Prosecution, detention, expulsion, repatriation or
deportation 158 must be done separately and in a transparent manner, i.e.;

in bona

fide tradition. However, the distinction between individuals or groups considered as
stowaways, attempted stowaways and other categories is very delicate for the
authorities and policy makers, in drafting effective and efficient policies to eliminate
these threats. The potential consequences related to this menace are a multi-faceted
problem, whereby risks and vulnerabilities are revealed, exposing the grey areas
related to enforcement regimes. Given the above, there are huge legal and
jurisdictional implications arising from the phenomenon of stowaways or illegal
migrants by sea.
The reader will next be introduced to the legal definitions related to the key
words and terms associated with this study. Furthermore, a critical analysis of the
relevant conventions will also be submitted.
156

Supra, footnote 151 at p.41, “ …once the stowaways are landed, additional costs are coming into the
arena , such as health and welfare costs , administrative procedures, etc…”, whereas, “expenses on board
the ship for repatriation, fines, delays, cleaning and bedding etc…, fall on the shipowner’s side”. See also
the risks covered by P& I Clubs, such as those stipulated in rule 19(5) and (6) of North England P&I Club,
< www.nepia.com >, (June, 2007). These rules give an overview of claims which may be covered by the
Club if the shipowner can prove that all steps have been taken to avoid stowaways boarding the ship. Only
diversion expenses imply specific conditions prior consideration of the claim by the insurers.
157
See IMO Guidelines on the Allocation of Responsibilities to Seek the Successful Resolution of
Stowaway cases, Res.A.871 (20), adopted on 27 November 1997, defining clearly the procedures to be
adopted by masters, shipowners, port authorities, national administrations, and other related bodies to
cooperate to prevent illegal access to a vessel while it is in port, and those related to countries of transit.
158
See Gilles de Kerchove and Anne Weyembergh, (eds.), Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in the
Penal Field within the European Union, (Brussels: Université Libre de Brussels, January, 2001). The
authors highlighted the need to harmonize and unify the penal procedures in the European Union (E.U) and
also emphasized on the need of a mutual recognition regarding the judicial decisions related to the threats
described in this chapter.
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3.1.4

The notion of stowaways and different national legal regimes
The first attempt to tackle the issue was done by CMI with the

International Convention relating to stowaways in 1957, giving the first definition of
stowaway 159 , measures to be taken when discovered on board and the procedures for
disembarkation, and costs for repatriation supported by the shipowner. States did not
adhere to it and became later a death born convention, and never entered into force.
IMO’s response to the threat was the FAL Convention, 1965 as amended 160 ,
introducing clear definitions on attempted stowaway, “A person who is secreted on a
ship, or in cargo…., and who is detected on board before it has departed from the
port”, whereas stowaway means “…., detected on board after it has departed from a
port or in the cargo while unloading it in the port of arrival, and is reported as a
stowaway by the Master to the appropriate authorities”. The penal provisions
regarding this kind of offence vary from one State to another. As for example, in the
USA 161 , “…..shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both”, whereas in the UK 162 a fine based on a standard scale is used to determine the
sanction. In contrast, in Algeria the Algerian Maritime Code (AMC) in its Article
545 stipulates “that any person who stow away is found on board a ship with intent
of using the ship for crossing abroad is punished six (06) months to five (05) years
imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 Algerian Dinards to 50,000 Algerian Dinards. The
same sanctions apply for seafarers if convicted of complicity…” A disparity in the
regimes worldwide is observed, varying from one country to another, regarding fines
under their domestic law, proving that their enforcement mechanisms are not
harmonized. There is a dire need for new procedures and clear definitions regarding
159

See International Convention Relating to Stowaways, 1957 art.1, “ stowaway means a person who, at
any port or place in the vicinity thereof, secretes himself in a ship without the consent of the shipowner or
the Master ….and who is on board after the ship has left that port or place”.
160
The International Convention on Facilitation of International Traffic, 1965 was amended in 2002 and
2005, introducing clear definitions on attempted stowaway and stowaway in Annex section 1, A, fixing
standards and recommended practices for all related issues on stowaways.
161
See US Code , title 18, crimes and criminal procedures part I, ch.107, S.2199, seamen and stowaways,
such crimes are fined not more than $1,000 ,< http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/>, (April 29,2007).
162
Under UK Merchant Shipping Act 1995, C.21, S.103 related to stowaways, it is considered as an offence,
“…shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale”, also under
S.104, unauthorized presence on board ship,“….shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not
exceeding level 5 on the standard scale”.
< http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1995 /Ukpga_19950021_en_5.htm#mdiv103 >, (April 29, 2007).
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the notion of “maritime crime” and “maritime offence”. Additionally, all existing
conventions do not provide legal definitions on terrorism and maritime terrorism acts.
These gaps generate grey areas which are barriers to harmonization and uniformity
of procedures and effective interpretation.

Figure 8:

The Stowaway Continuum 163

As illustrated in Figure 8, the spectrum and continuum vary
from less violent maritime criminal acts to high violent maritime criminal acts
according to the case, increasing the risks and potential consequences. Different steps
are involved in this continuum and various conventions come into light as the
incident falls in one of the three categorized scenarios. The preventive measures are
the most important factors in maritime security to ensure an efficient and effective
system and if they fail, remedial measures or mitigation will reduce the consequences
due to the incident 164 .
The legal regimes vary from one State to another and national standards
adopted through legislation are the basis for defining the sanctions, such as fines and
163

This figure has been inspired by MLAW 301, lecture handouts on “Penal Law, Advanced Issues in
Public and Private Maritime Law” of Professor Proshanto K. Mukherjee, WMU, (March, 2007).
Depending on the considered criminal act which may vary from less to highly violent maritime act.
164
See Professor P.K. Mukherjee and Max Mejia Jr., “The SUA Convention 2005: a critical evaluation of
its effectiveness in suppressing maritime criminal acts”, The Journal of International Maritime Law, Vol.12,
No.3, May-June 2006, at p.171 and p.176-179. A critical review of SUA convention has been done.
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penalties to be considered regarding prosecution of stowaways, attempted stowaways
and persons helping them in gaining access to ships. The consequences are various
and their impacts on the ship, crew, cargo and the environment are important in case
of terrorism. Criminalization of the offenders if they are crew members is another
issue to consider, depending on the breaches of the code of conduct or disciplinary
code according to the jurisdiction involved. Stowaways as asylum seekers must be
treated in compliance with international protection principles set out in relevant
treaties 165 .Regarding the issues on stowaways; international legal regimes do not
tackle the problem in its totality, so inadequacy and grey areas persist, mainly
regarding the treatment of seafarers. The 2005 Protocol of the SUA Convention

166

has introduced an approach to the problem by tackling the issue on human dignity
and rights of crew members on board a ship, but nothing on the legal enforcement
regime and harmonization of procedures.
The case Romania v. Chang 167 traumatized the whole maritime community
in 1996, when three stowaways were thrown overboard. On the one hand a
proliferation of international instruments strengthens the burden on ships; but on the
other hand there are increased costs, delays, and risk of searches, seizure, and other
prosecutions. The master alone takes all responsibilities on his shoulder and faces
pressures from the external world. He has to decide on what is an unlawful act,
contrary to the maritime traditions. Fatality or lack of enforcement regimes, are both
involved in the tragic events regarding stowaways dying silently without any
assistance. The threats will exist and only a common decision at international level
165

See the 1951 Refugee Convention, UNHCR and its Protocol 67, relating to the status of refugees,
defines exactly the term refugee. Art.1 A (1), International Organization for Migration (IOM) resolutions
must be taken into account. < http://www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp>, (April 8, 2007).
166
See article 8 bis of 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention 88, setting some procedures to be followed for
ensuring that all person on board are treated in conformity with the applicable provisions of international
law on human dignity and rights.
167
1997 Carswell NS 127(sub nom. Romania (State) v. Cheng), 114 C.C.C. (3d) 289, (sub nom.
Roumania v. Cheng) 158 N.S.R. (2d) 13, (sub nom. Roumania v. Cheng) 466 A.P.R. 13, [1997] N.S.J. No.
106, a Taiwan-flagged container ship has thrown 3 Romanian stowaways overboard in the icy high seas of
the Atlantic, murder suspects were released and the Canadian court rejected Romanian request for
extradition, only the flag State could investigate and the appropriate actions.
<http://international.westlaw.com/search /default.wl?spa=intmaritime-000&rs=WLIN7.02&fn=_top&sv
=Split&db=CAN-ALLCASES&vr=2.0&rp =%2fsearch%2fdefault.wl&mt=WestlawInternational >,
(April 18, 2007).
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on the issue, based on an effective and proactive approach could resolve the problem
in the long term.
The shipmaster has a legal and moral obligation to render assistance to
persons in distress at sea 168 without regard to their nationality, status or the
circumstances in which they are found. This longstanding maritime tradition is an
obligation enshrined in international law 169 .

3.2

Transportation of contraband goods and drugs by sea
The notion of “contraband” has not be clearly be defined by the international

instruments, but in its broad sense it means “an act of smuggling of a property that is
unlawfully produced, possessed, or transported” 170 . Even some existing overlapping
areas are found; trafficking differs from smuggling 171 . Acts of contraband concern
mainly fraudulent payments, fraudulent loading or unloading carried out either inside
the port or along the coast, acts of the removal or substitution during transportation
of goods, all acts of customs fraud, violations of legislative or regulatory provisions
and acts of importation or exportation without declaration.
168

See Rescue at Sea, a guide to principles and practice as applied to migrants and refugees, IMO/UNHCR.
Also, UNCLOS 82 in its article 98(1) provides that “Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its

flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render
assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue
of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected
of him”, and Article 98(2). SOLAS 74, as amended in chapter V, Regulation 33(1), obliges the master of a

ship to provide assistance to persons in distress after receiving the information and has the obligation to
proceed with all speed to rescue them and to inform SAR services, chapter V, regulation 7 requires State
Parties to ensure that distress communication and coordination are existent. The International Convention
on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), 1979 obliges State Parties to “….ensure that assistance be provided
to any person in distress at sea…..” (Chapter 2.1.10) and, to “provide medical assistance or other needs,
deliver the rescued persons in a safe place.”(Chapter 1.2.3). Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons
Rescued at Sea are helpful tools to guide governments and captains of ships for implementing the new
amendments as stipulated in MSC.167 (78).
169
See, Justin Stares and Bryan Reyes, “Brussels issues warning of stranded migrants”, Lloyd’s List, May
29, 2007. < http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/home/index.htm >, (May, 2007).
170
Means goods prohibited by law or treaty from being imported or exported, smuggled goods.
< http://research.lawyers.com/glossary/contraband.html >, (May 8, 2007).
171
See UNDOC for the distinction between trafficking from smuggling. Therefore, two Protocols are
available, one on trafficking and one on smuggling, have been adopted in December 2000 to supplement
the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, definitions in both Protocols, art.3(a). Alien
smuggling is the procurement of illegal entry by a person into a State assisted by a facilitator who has the
objective of making a profit; trafficking involves an additional element of coercion or other forms of
violence., < http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/res5525e.pdf >, (May 18, 2007).
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It can be noted that the scope of concern is very large and may involve
different enforcement authorities, such as customs, police and other agencies
depending on the domestic law regime. The concept of contraband of goods under
national legislation often includes provisions related to seizure and confiscation of
goods that have been used in connection with a crime 172 . In many States, different
enforcement regimes are adopted 173 .
In the Maghreb region, disparities regarding these offences and punishments
stipulated in their Penal Codes are observed and the different official reports
highlight the increase of narcotics’ use and smuggling cases. Therefore, for the same
crime or criminal offence, the sanctions, fines or penalties are not uniform
worldwide 174 and particularly in this region. It is important to highlight that
smuggling contraband by sea is a matter of customs administrations in various
countries and evasion of duty or tariffs applicable and bypassing controls are the
main motives. In the Maghreb States, the items most frequently smuggled are
cigarettes, alcohol, spirits, electronic equipment, jewellery and various others,
depending on the market. It is demand driven and changes rapidly with the
globalisation and various factors 175 .
Different types of smuggling can be distinguished, such as goods smuggled
as transported commodity, or amount of goods smuggled. It can be goods transported
by an individual or in large scale using different means of transportation. Regarding
172

See US Code title 19, related to customs duties ch.4, III.V on enforcement provisions.
< http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title19/chapter4_subtitleiii_partv_.html> (April 8, 2007).
173
See J.C. Smith and Brian Hogan, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, 3rd edition, London: Butterworth
& Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1986, at pp.110-120. The authors highlighted the issue of strict liability and drug
offences. Fernandez Case [1970], U.K. Crim. LR 277, CA. A seaman was convicted of possessing cannabis
when he was given a package to bring into England and he took it. He was caught and found guilty even he
did not know that the package contained prohibited drugs. His mental state was an important factor
considered by the judges.
174
See Australian Custom Act 1901 < http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1901124/>
(April 20, 2007). See the sanctions, fines and penalties are differently perceived for smuggling cases as
mentioned in comparison in the Maghreb penal codes.
175
See Jagdish N.Bhagwati and Bent Hansen, “A Theoretical Analyse of Smuggling”, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics,Vol.89,No.4 (Nov, 1975), at pp.651-657, < http://www.jstor.org/cgibin/jstor/printpage/00335533 /di951822/95p0093r/0.pdf?backcontext=page&dowhat= Acrobat&config=
jstor&userID= c3b2f7a3@mah.se/01cc99331400501bc2633&0.pdf > , (April 8, 2007).
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the area of crimes and offences, smuggling activities are crimes of opportunity. As
legal systems differ from one State to another, laws on taxation, customs and
sanctions also do so. This region is becoming the transit passage 176 for all smugglers
and traffickers from or outside the continent, using new routes to convoy their
prohibited items to Europe or other destination as published by Europol and WCO
reports in 2007. These threats are mainly observed by land and sea routes, because
the aviation industry has strengthened the security measures on planes and airports.
The Keck case 177 has set the contours of most smuggling regulations in the
U.S.A. Enforcement power is exercised by customs in most countries and may board
any vessel, and examine the vessel and any merchandise or person carried on board.
Vessels may be brought into a port and investigated for compliance with regulations
as stipulated in the national legislation. Ships involved in smuggling could be
confiscated, sold or destroyed in extreme cases. Law enforcement is one of the most
important aspects of the controls regarding smuggling. The risks 178 and potential
consequences are that from normal contraband goods, drugs and arms could come
into the picture and at the end of the spectrum, terrorist trying to smuggle nuclear
devices, safety, security and the environment could be directly affected.
Thus, a continuum for contraband of goods and drugs is needed to understand
the relationship between the risks, incidents/threats and the preventive measures on a
defined scale. As illustrated in Figure 9 below, from minor to a catastrophic scenario,
risks are higher.

176

John Zarocastas, “Drug smugglers target countries in three continents for transshipment”, Lloyd’s List,
March 8, 2007. Cocaine and new drugs are transshipped through the African continent by the smugglers.
177
Keck v. U S, 172 U.S. 434 (1899), a passenger on a ship attempted to bring diamonds into an US port
and was caught during the search aboard that ship by the customs, the Court decided that person was not
guilty and did not smuggle , because she had the opportunity to claim them after she would disembark from
the ship.< http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=172&invol=434> ( April 9, 2007).
See B.A.H. Paritt, Illegal Drugs by Sea, London: The Nautical Institute, 1998 at p.7 and p.24. It is also
suggested to use International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse: Guidelines
for Owners and Masters on Recognition and Detection, London: Secretary General, ICS, (August 1988).
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Figure 9:

The continuum for contraband of goods and drugs 179

The Santorini case on weapons smuggling in 2003 and Karine A case 180 are
the most related examples regarding this issue. By analyzing the spectrum, different
international instruments described in the beginning of this paper come into the
pictures for high violent criminal acts and maritime zones issues. For nuclear devices,
SUA 88 and its Protocols 181 and other UN treaties apply. The ISPS Code does not
provide a law enforcement provision for States; it is left to national legislation.
Criminal legislation deals with misdeclaration to customs and contraband issues,
because it is a crime according to the treaties and it falls under the Penal regime, as
criminal offence. The main grey areas are the complexity of procedures which
hamper the free trade facilitation as stipulated by GATT/WTO, UNCITRAL 182 . The
proactive approach is the solution.
179

Supra, see footnote 163 at p.45. The author highlights the usefulness of the continuum for crimes.
The Karin A was a 4,000 ton freighter intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces on 3 January 2002 while
it carried a wide variety of weapons. While the ship itself was worth an estimated $400,000 and the civilian
cargo used to conceal the weapons approximately $3,000,000
< http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/katyusha.htm>, (May 8, 2007).
181
SUA 88 means the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, 1988 and the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention, Article 3 stipulates , “… and the placing
of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it”.
182
UNCITRAL has published documents on commercial fraud where smuggling was considered as a threat
and new procedures were implemented in the shipping industry.
180
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The complexity of procedures under customs provisions must be simplified.
Regarding policy issues, overlapping conventions dealing with the same subject exist
and new approaches must be implemented, such as enforcement strategies,
international co-operation and communication with the organizations involved,
effective networks, regional cooperation, audits, and a review of operational
procedures by strengthening the sanctions if breaches are detected. As societies move
forward, trade is increasing, and the container security will be the main concern as
more mega container ships are built. A priority for the effective implementation of
measures is necessary. The transport chain risk and multi modal issues will increase,
due to new threats, technology, new markets, creating a need for developing
countries to overcome the gaps and lack of uniformity. Exchange of information
based on intelligence and studies done on database research on crimes should be
done.
A review of law enforcement procedure is necessary. For container issues,
models based on Container Security initiative and C-TPAT 183 may be used to
reinforce the national legislation and strengthen the countermeasures in case of
incidents. Drug smuggling by sea is a phenomenon of the illegal drug trade based on
the thinking that those who take the least risk earn the most money, while those who
take the most risk, earn the least regarding seamen involved in numerous cases.
Official reports highlight these trends in the Maghreb region, particularly in Morocco,
Algeria 184 and Tunisia. The type of drug smuggled in this area is essentially the kif,
but cocaine and other illicit drugs have entered the arena recently and are threatening

183

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT): to secure the Supply Chain, and control
effectiveness.
184
The recent case related to the Algerian M/V El Djorf belonging to the shipping company CNAN Group
was arrested in the port of Antwerp in Belgium for possession on board of an important quantity of kif, 12
stowaways on board and contraband of cigarettes was brought the public attention. The ship was detained
as result of an administrative procedure and the penalties for its release were fixed to 100,000 Euros. The
vessel was sailing to Turkey, but during the voyage it received an order to deviate to Antwerp. The
Algerian authorities at the arrival of the ship in Algiers immediately prosecuted and jailed the master and
some managers involved from the shipping company according to the national newspaper El Watan, May 2,
2005. < http://www.elwatan.com/spip.php?page=article&id_article=18413 >, (June, 2007).
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the whole shipping trade. Ships and other means of transportation by sea are the most
targeted in view of the latest incidents 185 .
Law enforcement may become obsolete as globalisation is increasing, and
risk management could be a solution for detecting the new threats. Data exchange on
crimes, organized crime and transnational organized crime can draw the real picture
of the situation as long as security assessment is done on accurate information about
threats and implementation processes. The harmonizing of policies to ensure free
movement of goods and diminishing the risks are important objectives to realise.
Tracking product seizure, counterfeit goods policies have to be strengthened.
Contraband of goods by crew on board a ship is a serious breach under the Penal
Code and Shipping Legislation 186 . However, in fixing the sanctions by criminalizing
seafarers, an important and complex debate for the maritime industry 187 should be
raised.
Some actions are needed in the arena of policy making to balance the threats
by using high technology and IMO Guidelines, and other treaties related to
contraband of goods by sea. A proactive approach is required for policy makers,
based on gathering information, co-operation at all levels and commitment of all
entities involved by instituting audits, and controlling effective implementation in
order to harmonize the procedures, gathering new technologies and analyzing the
costs. The main benefit against this cancer threatening the modern society would be
on the public side by ensuring effective policy making based on social, political and
economical considerations. However, a review and separation of conventions related
or linked directly to the same matters could be done, by eliminating ambiguity and
overlapping issues.

185

Eoin O’Cinneide, “Drug ship seized off Spain, in the Alboran Sea between Spain and Morocco”, Trade
Winds, (February 16, 2007).
186
See U.K Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (C. 21) for crew offences.
187
See Andree Kirchner, “Maritime security: consequences for maritime transport industry”, in Ocean
Yearbook, Vol.19: maritime transport and security, pp.299-309, International Ocean Institute (IOI),
London: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

52

Transportation of contraband goods and stowaways share some similar
ingredients regarding the evolution of events, and associated risks involving potential
consequences according to the analysis of their continuum. A minor threat may
become a catastrophic scenario or incident if the preventive measures fail. Both need
efficient means to mitigate after deterrence and have the same sanctions if a maritime
criminal act occurs. Therefore, new tools are needed for policy makers and
legislators in the Maghreb, such as efficient and proactive solutions regarding
enforcement regimes at all levels. Innovation, harmonization of procedures and
cooperation are vital to ensure fairness and equity regarding penalties and fines
applied in different jurisdictions. The Maghreb countries facing gaps in their
enforcement capabilities and considering to have elaborated statutory provisions in
their maritime legislation should enhance the standards used, by addressing the
issues on stowaways, criminal offences, fines and penalties with regard to the public
welfare and the shipping industry 188 .
Regulatory and penal provisions should be reinforced by assessing all
probable threats faced by the ports, port facilities and ships by collaborating with all
enforcement authorities and agencies involved in the sector. Regarding certain
treaties and international instruments, overlapping issues and new needs may be
considered in the short term to tackle all grey areas requiring improvements and
harmonization based on regional agreements. Policy proposals may consist in an
increased cooperation between all authorities to exchange data on smuggling and
stowaways, for gathering information, on the different audits and risk management 189 .
Security costs and cost benefit analysis must be done regularly. Enforcement of
policy, implementation mechanisms, new countermeasures are needed in view of the
latest data published by IMO 190 and UN agencies regarding the issues related to
188

See Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maritime Legislation, Malmö: World Martime University, 2002 at p.186
and p.195. A detailed explanation on different steps to be undertaken in drafting legislation is given by the
author. Also, different drafting processes anatomies of statutes, styles and forms are provided.
189
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society-Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage Publications, 1992. The author
emphasizes on the perception of risks by the society and the evolution of technology contributing to new
threats and challenges.
190
See IMO report, “Rescue at sea, responding to migrants and asylum”, Seaways, October 2006.
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contraband, smuggling, trafficking and stowaways. The use of IMO guidelines 191 ,
UN reports and the maritime industry practices 192 could diminish the risks of
occurrence by targeting the organized crime and on a basis of regional agreements an
exchange of information between all authorities concerned and the building of an
international network to facilitate the sea trade.

In conclusion, contraband of goods and drugs as well as stowaway issues
could be tackled by resolving the missing legal and technical aspects by encouraging
security expertise 193 and building a culture based on awareness and challenges 194 .
The Maghreb region considered as a bridge between Europe and the continent will
continue to suffer from all these threats and only long term solutions may resolve
partly some of them.

The reader will in the next chapter be exposed to policy issues related to State
responsibility and government strategies on transportation of stowaways, drugs and
contraband goods by sea from a Maghreb regional perspective. The debate also
examines conflicting interests and assesses their impacts on policy making.

191

IMO guidelines assist in providing the standards to be adopted and give the recommended practices to
fight against these threats. See, revised Guidelines on Illicit drug traffick, MSC/Circ.228 (82), December
2006, MSC/Circ. 443, MSC/Circ.559, IMO-Res.A.867 (20), Res.A.871 (20) and A.872 (20), etc.
192
See Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO), “The shipmaster’s security manual: preventive
measures and remedies for drug smuggling, piracy and stowaways”, Copenhagen: BIMCO, 1998.
193
See Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO), “Ship Security”, BIMCO Bulletin, Vol.101, No.6,
December, 2006. The authors highlight the need of private security expertise from the shipping industry to
enhance maritime security awareness related to ship security issues.
194
See Paul Lightburn, International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code): port security
handbook, Surrey: Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay, 2004.The author emphasizes the importance of security
awareness and security expertise to tackle all security issues related to ports and port facilities.
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CHAPTER 4
DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY IN THE MAGHREB REGION:
NEW CHALLENGES OR DILEMMA?
“The welfare of the people is the ultimate law (Salus Populi Suprema Est Lex).”Marcus Tullius Cicero, Roman author, orator and politician, 106 BC-43 BC

4.1

The Maghreb region at the center of maritime security
concerns in the Mediterranean arena
For decades, Maghreb maritime security has been a sensitive issue for policy

makers, legislators and strategists, generating numerous debates on both sides of the
Mediterranean Sea. As mentioned in the previous chapters, little has changed on
stowaways, drugs, contraband goods by sea and related security issues. Even though
stowaway legislation and procedures have strengthened in the Maghreb region, they
are still a headache for the policy makers and the shipping industry. The ISM
Code 195 and the ISPS Code 196 did not create sufficient impact in resolving these
threats; their effects are still insignificant in reducing the level of the menace to a
minimum acceptable standard anticipated by the whole maritime community as they
were intended to foster positive continuous improvements in those States in the
Maghreb. The consequential costs and delays generated by such incidents were not
previously considered by the shipowners and other stakeholders of the maritime
195

See Phil Anderson, ISM Code: A practical guide to the legal and insurance implications, 2nd ed.,
London: Lloyd’s Practical Shipping Guides (LLP), 2005 at p.155 and p.164. Criminal liability and
insurance implications are highlighted by the author. Failure to comply with the Code may give rise to
criminal sanctions under the legislation implementing the Code itself in various jurisdictions.
196
See Regina Asariotis, “Implementation of the ISPS Code: an overview of recent developments”, Journal
of International Maritime Law, Vol.12, No.6, July-August 2005, at pp.275-276. Particular areas of concern
among interested parties in the shipping industry are exposed, particularly those concerning the access and
boarding procedures of ships and the fact that the uniform observance of mandatory regulations imposed by
the ISPS Code is still not achieved. The recent cases on stowaways, drugs and contraband by sea in the
Maghreb have highlighted the differences in compliance and illustrated that the control measures are still
insufficient to counter these threats.
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sector, and thus resulted in numerous complex issues, where all the actors involved
in the maritime adventure were confronted by an explosion of claims and had to find
the most appropriate countermeasures to reduce the effects of such threats.
The role of the Maritime Administration of the flag State197 is critical, because
it performs a number of crucial tasks within this context. As an authority issuing
certificates of compliance, the flag State is a key player involved in the whole
maritime security system 198 . In the Maghreb, even though the complete security
management process was done by different States involved on the due date for
implementation of the ISPS Code, the risks shifted and new challenges were faced by
policy makers and the shipping industry who had to respond proactively to these new
threats. As mentioned by Mejia, “the new regime is complicated and the various
threats perceived worldwide, as well as the varying readiness of States to implement
IMO instruments…..” 199 , have been brought to light during the recent years; and the
manner in which they have been done, was influenced by numerous and complex
factors. The latest data and graphs from the Maghreb region are shown in Annexes C
and D; they highlight the effects of these differences on global shipping and the sea
trade. In particular, the recent events and incidents related to stowaways, drugs and
contraband which occurred in the Maghreb States confirmed the previous hypothesis
put forward by this writer when analyzing the allocation of responsibilities with
respect to maritime security assessments and risk analysis of various port incidents

197

See UNCLOS 82, article 94 regarding the duties of the flag state.
The ISPS Code in Part A, Section 4.1 stipulates clearly the responsibilities of contracting governments
related to the security levels, guidance for protection from security incidents, and Section 4.3 sets out the
security related duties which may be delegated to a recognized security organization (RSO) and those
which may not, such as approving port facility security assessment (PFSA) and port facility security plan
(PFSP), their subsequent amendments, setting of the applicable security level, determining the port
facilities which will be required to designate a port facility security officer (PFSO), exercising the controls
and compliance measures pursuant to regulation XI-2/9, and establishing clearly the requirements regarding
the Declaration of Security (DOS). A test of effectiveness of approved ship security plans and port facility
security plans as well as the amendments to them, which the flag States have approved or those which have
been approved on their behalf must be done at regular interval to ensure the system is efficient and effective
all the time.
199
See Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, a selection of papers and
presentations from the Workshop-Symposium on the Practical Implementation and Critical Evaluation of
the ISPS Code 11-15 August 2003 and the International Symposium on Contemporary Issues in Maritime
Security 30 August to 1 September 2004, Malmö: WMU, 2005 at pp.9-15.
198
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and the link between causes and consequences related to flag states, companies and
ships entitled to fly their flags, and masters’ responsibilities.

4.2

New legal approaches and the revision of existing maritime
security regimes: a possible solution for policy makers
The threats generated by poor enforcement regimes have legal and

commercial consequences which are borne by all parties involved in the maritime
shipping sector and sea trade. Therefore, a proactive approach should be taken by the
national authorities through various reviews of the existing policies and
implementation processes already in force in their jurisdictions. Additionally, a
continuous security reassessment of port facilities and ships entitled to fly their flags
should be done according to a regular schedule in the Maghreb region, as stipulated
by the ISPS Code and national law, in order that national designated authorities who
are charged with the responsibility to verify the whole risk management system and
to control the efficiency and effectiveness of all approved plans and procedures in
force since 1st July 2004, could act accordingly. New legal and ergonomic
considerations 200 as well as law and economics of maritime security 201 aspects
should be taken into account by policy makers and legislators when drafting
legislation and/or inserting amendments into existing instruments in their domestic
law, and when attempting to promote security awareness and reduce to a minimum

200

See Proshanto K. Mukherjee and Max Mejia, “The ISPS Code: legal and ergonomic considerations”, in
Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, a selection of papers and
presentations from the Workshop-Symposium on the Practical Implementation and Critical Evaluation of
the ISPS Code 11-15 August 2003 and the International Symposium on Contemporary Issues in Maritime
Security 30 August to 1 September 2004, Malmö: WMU, 2005 at pp.40-44. The authors have emphasized
the human behavioral and biological characteristics, which influence the human interaction with the system.
They have also focused on the norms adopted by IMO in rule-making as well as the different steps and
processes involved in the implementation of the ISPS Code. Finally, an in-depth analysis on the subject is
provided to highlight the changes taking place in the legal maritime security arena, bringing to light the
need for new considerations and initiatives by all the actors involved in reviewing legal issues related to
this sensitive domain of “maritime security awareness”.
201
See Jingjing Xu, “The law and economics of maritime security: selected issues in perspective”, in
Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, a selection of papers and
presentations from the Workshop-Symposium on the Practical Implementation and Critical Evaluation of
the ISPS Code 11-15 August 2003 and the International Symposium on Contemporary Issues in Maritime
Security 30 August to 1 September 2004, Malmö: WMU, 2005 at pp.319-329.
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the number of incidents related to the threats described in this dissertation.
Additionally, private law aspects and commercial concerns 202 associated with
emerging issues in the domain of maritime security should be considered when
analyzing the available data and annual reports on incidents occurring in Maghreb’s
ports or aboard ships while in their jurisdictions. Trade facilitation and the shipping
industry interests must be preserved and policy makers should tackle these sensitive
issues from all sides and perspectives to identify the most appropriate methods to be
used when assessing, evaluating, reviewing and implementing new legal perspectives
to their national legislation. The improvement of preventive and remedial security
measures depends on the methods and concepts used during the different steps
concerned by the review process as well as the result of cost-benefit-analysis.

Figure 10:

Flow chart “Implementation Process” (ISPS Code - SOLAS, Ch.XI-2)

As described in Figure 10, a top down approach should be carried out when
implementing the ISPS Code by the Contracting Government. The policy makers,
legislators and experts in maritime security may use this flow chart during the review
stage to identify different responsibilities 203 and tasks to be undertaken by the
numerous actors involved in the whole system. Three security levels are to be
202

Delays, restriction of maritime commercial operations, detention or expulsion of vessels from ports have
huge impacts on the costs suffered by the shipowners or charterers and any other trading party involved.
203
See the responsibilities of contracting governments, obligations of companies and ships (ISPS code).
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considered by a State Party, desiring to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of its
implementation process by giving a clear picture on what should be done and which
entity is entitled to do it according to the mandatory provisions of part A of the ISPS
Code and the requirements of SOLAS chapter XI-2.
The maritime security verification surveys are conducted by Flag State
Administrations 204 or Recognized Security Organizations (RSO) acting on their
behalf, to ensure that the security system at all levels of the different parties involved,
comply with the requirements stipulated in the ISPS Code part A and SOLAS
chapter XI-2, and should be conducted in accordance with internationally accepted
audit practices, such as ISO 10011-1.
The IMO guidelines are useful documents giving clear guidance on how to
address the different issues at all levels, and thus, policy makers may find important
information on required standards, development of procedures and implementation
processes. The flows of information and communication channels used to manage
the system are vital components which must be taken into account by all parties
involved at the different management levels. It should be done internally as well as
externally to improve the flow of security information.

Maghreb
States

Algeria
Libya

IMO
Stowaway
Focal Point
(FSP)

Mauritania

Morocco
Tunisia

Flow of security information
© Copyright Semir Tarek Maksen, 2007

Figure 11:

Flow of security information between the Maghreb region & IMO

204

See section 4 and 19 Part/ A and the guidance given in Part/B, ISPS Code for the requirements regarding
flag State Administrations responsibilities as well as those stipulated in the different sub-sections related to
the main parts of the Code and under the regulations of chapter XI-2, SOLAS 74, as amended.
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Figure 12:

Flow chart “Security Information” (ISPS Code - SOLAS, Ch.XI-2)

As mentioned in Figure 12, the reporting system and flow of security
information related to the different threats, incidents, events, data and other related
security matters are important components of the system, and are vital to ensure a
continuous up dating and exchanges of security information at the security level
decided by the competent national authorities. Policy makers may use it as a tool to
improve the grey areas in the system and when they are reviewing existing laws.
The establishment of a stowaway focal point (SFP) at IMO is an important
proactive step to focus, improve the management of security related information, and
obtain up dated data on attempted stowaways/stowaways incidents from Contracting
Governments. However, incidents on smuggling drugs on board ships / port facilities
or related issues should be considered by IMO, as well as the phenomenon of
contraband goods, endangering the maritime adventure in many parts of the world 205 .
Clear reports and statistics on those incidents or presumed events, should be provided
by Contracting Governments to present an overview of the subject.
205

Colley West Shipping Company Ltd. v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2006 FC 1419. The
court stated that the application for judicial review of a decision ordering the agent to pay the costs of
deporting a stowaway who had entered Canada illegally was allowed and the demand for payment quashed.
This case highlights the immigration and deportation costs issues and the liability of agent for stowaways.
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These reports or data may be useful in examining in-depth the root causes and
consequences of those previously enumerated threats, hence, furnishing in the short
term the possibility of obtaining efficient and effective procedures, which may assist
many States in combating such maritime crimes. New guidelines on these sensitive
issues, delivered under IMO auspices would be a revolutionary step in tackling
proactively this modern cancer with its various metastases, threatening the whole
shipping industry, as long as globalization and the increase of sea trade are the fixed
goals for the coming years.
New concerns on this sensitive subject have been considered by the European
Union (EU) 206 and many reports from its member States in 2007 here highlighted the
growing risks existing in the Mediterranean Sea arena. Since the Maghreb region is
at the centre of their preoccupations and the problem is localized in these transit
countries, the solutions to maritime security issues will remain a huge challenge207 .
From the Maghreb perspective, new legal regimes and amendments are
urgently needed including the incorporation of proactive approaches by the member
States into their national legislation, to counter attempted stowaways and stowaways’
incidents, smuggling of drugs and contraband goods offences, occurring widely as
indicated in published reports of IMO, UNODC, WCO and EUROPOL on the
subject. These threats cover numerous serious crimes which are aimed at financial
and private gain, usually masterminded by organized crime syndicates which
facilitate the illegal transport aboard ships of the outlaw commodities and unlawful
entry into States, through port facilities in countries of origin, as well as in countries
of destination. Urgent efforts to tackle these sensitive issues at a macro level is the

206

See EU directives 2005/65/EC, regulation (EC) No. 725/2004, adopted the 31 March 2004, on
enhancing ship and port facility security and the Commission regulation (EC) No. 884/2005 of 10 June
2005, laying down procedures for conducting Commission inspection in the field of maritime security, as
well as related reports published by the European Union Commissions and their policy implications within
the community and related costs shared among the States to implement efficiently and effectively the
security measures adopted in the EU. <www.eur-lex.europa.eu >, (July 2007).
207
See Europol report, “Organized Illegal immigration into the European Union”, The Hague (Netherlands):
Europol, January 2007, <http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Serious_Crime_Overviews/ Facilitated
_Illegal_ Immigration_FactSheeet2007.pdf>, (July 25, 2007).

61

first approach, and later at a micro level, attempts need to be made to identify the
most appropriate countermeasures to eliminate the risks generated by many grey
areas and gaps in national legislation, ports regulations, companies’ and ships’
procedures. In particular, those described threats menacing the sea trade and
endangering the whole shipping sector, bringing to light new concerns to policy
makers and legislators in the Maghreb region, such as the criminalization of
seafarers 208 , marine insurance claims and numerous other apprehensions from the
different involved parties must be carefully analyzed when drafting legislation and
pushing new regulations or rules into the national security arena.

4.3

Maritime Security Incidents Mapping Concept and Analysis:
new perspectives for policy makers
Another point adding to the debate on these issues is related to the problem of

false documents used by the stowaways or provided by criminal organizations to
smugglers and traffickers involved in various forms of crimes or offences which
were not considered previously by policy makers and legislators, regarding the type,
nature and form of these new menaces and the appropriate sanctions, penalties and
fines to be incorporated into the existing legislation. Facilitated maritime criminal
208

See Proshanto K. Mukherjee, “Criminalization and unfair treatment: the seafarer’s perspective”, Journal
of International Maritime Law, vol. 12, No.5, September- October 2006, at pp.325-336. The author stated
that “Criminalization with reference to a person means turning someone into a criminal by making his or
her activity illegal. Thus, a person is criminalized if that person’s conduct or act is criminal”. The
punishments or the imposition of penal sanctions which defines a crime and permits to distinguish it from a
tort or delict, considered as civil wrong. Also, a clear distinction between criminal offence and an offence
must be made by the policy makers and legislators when drafting legislation. An offence is more considered
as a public welfare or regulatory offence, whereas, a criminal offence is depending on the proof of mens rea.
The author highlights clearly the distinction between mens rea offences and those characterized as strict
liability or half way house offences. These offences are based on proof of actus reus. Criminal offences are
based on the general principle “maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”, meaning that “only a guilty
mind makes an act criminal”. The provisions in the penal regimes indicate whether an offence is considered
as a mens rea or actus reus offence. In the maritime regulatory regimes arena, they are considered as
“violations” under the SOLAS Convention, ISPS Code requirements, MARPOL Convention, etc. Safety,
security and pollution offences often belong to the half-way house category as mentioned by professor
Mukherjee. Another important point highlighted by the author is to avoid seafarers to be assimilated as
scapegoats or victims of existing gaps in legal regimes, resulting in an unfair punishment in many cases.
Human rights and particularly fundamental rights in the treatment of seafarers should be considered by the
policy makers and legislators when drafting legislation and transforming violations under regulatory
regimes into offences in domestic law.
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activities in their broad sense cover the production and procurement of falsified
documents, providing false visa and permits to presumed stowaways, refugees, or
asylum seekers seeking to get access by any available means to port facilities and
aboard ships. In the worst case scenario, terrorists smuggled as stowaways hidden on
board commercial vessels escape the country of origin and enter illegally a foreign
territory to commit unlawful acts against defined targets. In this context, policy
makers face complex issues. Dealing with these offences is a huge challenge as well
as a dilemma for unprepared Administrations with regard to the most appropriate
procedures, countermeasures and responses to this menace. Thus, any maritime
crime is revealed as a serious complex problem for the legislator in terms of
categorization according to the existing law.
Considering the different UN treaties on the subject and their implementation
into the national field is another challenge or dilemma for policy makers and
legislators. Issues of organized crime, corruption, trafficking in human beings,
counter terrorism, transnational offences, illegal migration, smuggling of drugs by
ships or other means of transport by sea, contraband of goods and criminal justice
reforms, etc., imply huge sacrifice on the part of the people involved in grappling
with these sensitive security matters, as not only expertise in the field is required, but
also the participation of the whole society to preserve the social interests 209 . State
responsibility 210 , sovereignty and national interests have a bearing on solving these
emerging problems. Strict application of the laws and their punishments as stipulated
by the existing instruments in the domestic field here featured prominently in
determining the most appropriate sanctions to eliminate these threats. However, their
209

Security policies are often confronted with strong social, political, and economic interests. Government
failures to tackle these sensitive maritime security issues, discussed in this chapter may generate conflicts
and claims which hamper policy makers in finding a balanced way to satisfy all parties involved in the
problem. Social interests are numerous and must be considered when studying the market and externalities.
210
See U.N document A/ CN.4/ 315, “ force majeure” and “ fortuitous event” as circumstances precluding
wrongfulness: survey of State practice, international judicial decisions and doctrine-study prepared by the
Secretariat on: “State responsibility”, extract from the year book of the International Law Commission,
1978,vol.II(1) at p.91.See also ILC articles 1,2, 3, 4 and 5, General Principles on State responsibility,
wrongful acts under international law, elements of an internationally wrongful acts of a State,
characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful and the notion of “ Act of the State”.
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effects are insufficient in light of the latest reported incidents in the Maghreb region.
Preventive measures 211 are the most important factors to be considered in protecting
critical infrastructures, port facilities, companies and ships, and reducing the
vulnerabilities and risks generated by such threats. Remedial measures or mitigation
actions 212 come into play only after the incident occurs and provide the last barrier
before the existing defense system collapses and affects the general security, safety
and environment around it.
When drafting legislation or implementing new regulations and rules into the
existing legislation 213 , policy makers and legislators must keep in mind those details
and try to revise all existing instruments according to the expressed needs, available
data and statistics, reports from recognized experts on the subject, as well as the flow
of information at internal and external levels which may predict the likelihood of the
situation in advance and thus allow immediate actions to be taken to minimize risks
and potential consequences in the short-term. For the long-term, a strict policy
analysis on the subject must be undertaken 214 . A closer look at analytical functions is
also needed, because the nature of policy analysis can vary widely 215 . As mentioned
by Weimer and Vining, “Public policy encourages, discourages, prohibits, or
prescribes private actions. Beginning with the premise that individuals generally act
in their own best interests, policy analysts bear the burden of providing the rationale
for any governmental interference with private choice. The burden applies to
evaluating existing policies as well as new initiatives” 216 . As a primordial element in
any analysis, it frequently provides the best initial insight into complex situations,
211

Preventive measures are those implemented to prevent any incident or event to occur.
Mitigation actions are those measures in place to be used after an incident occurred to mitigate its effects.
213
Supra, see footnote 188 at p.53. See, transformation of conventions into national legislation at p.217.
214
See David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, Policy Analysis: concept and practice, 3rd ed., New Jersey:
Prentice Hall , Inc., 1998, at pp.28-34.
215
Ibid. at p.39, the author states that a structured analysis that assesses problems, systematically compares
alternatives for solving them. Policy makers must have an understanding of political and organizational
behavior in order to predict and influence the feasibility of adoption and successful implementation of
policies. Technical skills are required as well as a framework for ethics.
216
Ibid. at p.58, the author emphasizes the efficiency of the ideal conceptual model and suggests taking into
consideration other factors, such as human dignity, the promotion of fairness, distributional equity,
economic opportunity and political participation, etc.
212
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which is the case in stowaways, smuggling and trafficking issues. Rationale for
public policy must be taken into account by policy makers, such as social welfare,
values, norms, habits, customs, conventions and other factors that influence or affect
directly the decision-making process. Additionally, the political feasibility and social
indicators 217 must also be considered in drafting legislation or amending regulations
in the existing instruments. Another point to be considered is related to the costs
generated by regulations 218 . Both law and the economics of maritime security are
important components which should be considered when analyzing in-depth security
incidents which will give a global overview of the different costs shared by the
various parties involved

219

and provide the necessary tools and concepts in

overcoming budgetary constraints or interpreting economic effects caused by new
security measures or countermeasures implemented by policy makers to solve the
problem. Law and economics analysis of a security incident could assist investigators
to determine the costs and policy impacts generated by such an event. Thus,
incentives, opportunity costs, market mechanisms and prices deducted from the indepth study of the security incident are vital components to be considered. They
provide the most efficient economic approach to law and policy adoption by using
Pareto or Kaldor-Hick efficiency 220 concepts according to the case and available
parameters to measure the certainty and severity of punishment. Preventive measures
217
Social indicators are measures of changes in social welfare, such as unemployment rate, inflation,
balance of payment, gross and net national product, etc.
218
Supra, footnote 214 at p.64. It was mentioned that “regulations can be extremely costly and that they
operate often through command and control”, and “directives are given, compliance is monitored, and non
compliance is punished”. If there is extensive consumer demand for cheap prohibited items or illegal
products, the result is increase of smuggling and contraband as well as black markets, which are generating
deadweight losses and negative externalities. In the context of criminal sanctions, severe punishments may
provide a powerful deterrent, but they may also discourage security agencies or other parties involved from
reporting incidents or events on the discussed threats as mentioned in this dissertation.
219
Supra, footnote 201 at p.57. See pp.322-323. The author highlights the utility of optimal level of
prevention in terms of cost and benefit for analyzing costs of security incidents.
220
See James R. Seldon, “Efficacy, effectiveness and efficiency in human resource use: a primer on the
three e’s,” International Journal of Public Administration, Vol.16, No.7, 1993 at pp.921-943. The author
highlights the disputes over resource use, particularly in the public sector and opines that technical
efficiency requires getting the most from inputs and allocative efficiency is by far the most problematic.
The Pareto principle states that “resources are being used incorrectly if redeploying inputs or redistributing
outputs which can add benefits for some members of society without harming any others”. The Kaldor
Hicks approach in part overcomes these limitations, but it has a price and sanctions which may imply a
willingness to accept its implications by the society. Efficiency is promoted when the total expected social
costs are reduced.
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and remedial measures must be analyzed separately and carefully. The cost-benefit
analysis of the scenario and different actions involved enable the determination of
the cost-effectiveness of the used security system. Policy makers, legislators and
investigators should keep in mind these basic concepts while seeking to find out the
most appropriate solutions to the problem by utilizing economic principles when
analyzing maritime security incidents.
In seeking to widen efforts to increase maritime security awareness in the
shipping world, IMO needs to consider new proposals for the international maritime
community and should call for new solutions to grapple with these challenges,
which have highlighted various deficiencies 221 . The initiative of introducing a new
member-state scheme will herald a new period in the regulation and protection of
shipping and port industries. Thus, flag States should be expected to provide
minimum standards of services by ensuring the quality of its services and the training
of its personnel involved in policing and managing maritime security processes. 222
The review of law and policy issues relevant to the “maritime crimes” 223 is an
urgent necessity. Maritime security incidents analysed from an ergonomic
perspective by using the general principles of law and ergonomics, based on a
macro-level analysis, permits the identification of the most relevant active and latent
221

David Osler, “IMO to trial Stowaway repatriation aid service”, Lloyd’s List, (August 8, 2007). IMO
established a “Stowaway Focal Point” (FSP) to assist shipowners and masters in repatriation issues, and to
offer assistance as well as support for the disembarkation of stowaways.
222
See, “IMO audit plan to benefit flags”, Trade winds, Vol.16, No.50, (December 16, 2005).
223
See Max Mejia Jr. and Proshanto, K. Mukherjee, “The SUA Convention 2005: a critical evaluation of its
effectiveness in suppressing maritime criminal acts”, The Journal of International Maritime Law, Vol.12,
No.3, May – June 2006, at pp.170-191. Professor Mukherjee highlights the need to clearly define a
“maritime crime”, because the existing conventions in the regulatory arena or in the criminal field do not
give a clear and concise explanation on what is considered as a maritime crime as well as the listing of such
offences considered as a crime according to international law. The SUA 88 Convention mentions only
unlawful acts and deals with a very narrow range of offences. Also, UNCLOS 82 is very limited in the
range of offences considered as maritime crimes or falling under the category of maritime violence. It deals
mainly with piratical acts on the high seas. The need to broaden the scope to include new offences is
necessary and urgent. Additionally, a clear definition on what is a maritime terrorism act is also needed. In
the existing international instruments, no definition on terrorism or maritime terrorist act is found, therefore,
policy makers and legislators must act proactively, and member States must urge IMO to tackle these issues
by redefining certain acts unclearly stated and poorly drafted. Globalization and advanced technology as
well as the increase of sea trade push maritime security in the forefront to combat and eliminate all new
threats which may come to light with time.
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conditions 224 that allowed the event to occur. It is a powerful tool for users, if they
manage adequately and correctly the concepts proposed in it 225 .
The interpretation of the available information provided in the “Security
Incident Map” (SecInciMap) 226 may offer to policy makers, legislators and
investigators relevant means for in-depth analysis of a complete real scenario related
to one of the following threats; stowaways, smuggling drugs or contraband goods by
sea. Consequently, recommendations based on findings may be used to improve the
existing maritime security law and policy, because the SecInciMap in this case,
reconstituted as a “Maritime Crime Incident Map” (MarCrimInciMap), can offer a
clear view of the deterrent factors, the topography and configuration of scenery and
equipment, and the flow of events and acts in a chronological order. Also, this
concept which may be adapted to maritime crimes and events highlights the gaps and
grey areas found at different levels of management involved in the incident, at the
national level from the top level down to the operational level, with regard to the
existing international instruments.
This method allows the identification of the areas in law and existing policies
at various levels, which need improvement or new input to counter and prevent such
incidents from occurring in the future. A clear security assessment of the ship as well
as port facilities is needed; thus, it implies a perfect risk security assessment process

224

See Maximo Q. Mejia Jr. and Roland Akselsson, ““AcciMapping” Maritime Security Incidents: a Pilot
Study”, Malmö: WMU, 2007, at pp.2-4. Adaptation of the Jens Rasmussen and Inge Svedung AcciMap
and the promotion of risk management tools are highlighted by the authors as well as the “active
conditions” which mean “conditions that have an immediate impact and contributory effect in allowing the
occurrence of a maritime security incident”, and “latent conditions” which are those conditions that “can lie
dormant for a period of time doing no particular harm until they interact with local circumstances to defeat
the system’s defences”. These are mentioned by Mejia based on a study done by Reason in 1997.
225
See Jens-Uwe Schröder, “Shipboard Security”, ISPS Code Workshop, Malmö: WMU, December 2005.
An important step to ensure a perfectly proactive security management system is to implement the most
appropriate risk management process to shipboard security as well as to port facilities security. However,
port security is more complex and is broader regarding internal and external factors influencing the whole
system.
226
See Jens Rasmussen and Inge Svedung, Proactive Risk Management in a Dynamic Society, Karlstad:
Risk center, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 2000, at p.11. An example of SecInciMap for a security
incident is provided in Annex M.
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to obtain the best cost-benefit measures related to the considered system, as
mentioned by Schröder. 227
The main objective of this maritime security incident map is to provide
legislators and policy makers with a powerful tool for maritime security management.
The “SecInciMap”, used in assessing maritime security or crimes, may assist in
investigating cases, employing macro-level analysis and providing findings, and
finally in assisting the formulation of proposals.
The use of new approaches and concepts is to demonstrate and prove their
utility by analyzing a maritime security incident, in order to:
•

identify significant factors in order to bring to light the most relevant
active and latent conditions;

•

conduct a vertical, macro-level analysis of that incident;

•

construct and explore the SecInciMap ; and to

•

detect the most appropriate solutions to eliminate inadequate security
measures existing in the system. 228

As mentioned by Mukherjee and Mejia, “Perhaps, the most significant feature
of the ISPS Code is that in contrast with UNCLOS, the SUA Convention, and the
CMI’s model national law which all deal with criminal law, the ISPS Code arguably
deals with ergonomics, i.e. it attempts to influence the behavior of seafarers and port
managers through elaborate regulatory procedures as preventive measures in relation

227

See in Annex O, the general security risk assessment process flow chart. The author highlights the
difference between safety and security in risk management. “Safety analysis and investigation is based on
unplanned events causing disturbance in the system”, whereas, “security focuses on activities planned or
designated to cause disturbances in systems. Policy makers should be aware of these differences and make
a clear dispatch when safety or security purposes are considered, while drafting legislation. See Jens-Uwe
Schröder, “An Introduction to Shipboard Security Risk Assessment”, in Max Mejia Jr. (ed.), Contemporary
Issues in Maritime Security, Malmö: WMU, 2005, at pp.101-116.
228
Supra, footnote 224 at p.67. Mejia addressed the objectives of this mapping method and the validity as
well as the reliability of the interpretation of its results found or expected in a security incident analysis.
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to combating criminal offences that pose a threat to maritime security” 229 ,
highlighting the usefulness of ergonomics in the maritime security arena by trying to
solve the problem and finding the deficiencies to be eliminated. Thus, SecInciMap or
MarCrimMap are tools which may assist, help and provide the means needed by
policy makers when tackling sensitive security issues or investigating maritime
criminal cases or acts, and finding the different gaps related to the responsibilities,
duties and procedures at all management levels as well as in the existing legal
regimes.
Maritime security incident or events are investigated to identify the causes of
their occurrence and to determine the actions that must be taken by the decision
makers to prevent recurrence. These security incidents are rarely simple and almost
never result from a single cause that could be immediately identified. Thus, the flow
of events in cases of stowaways or attempted stowaways 230 , smuggling of drugs or
contraband goods by sea is vital for highlighting the grey areas that need
improvement. Policy makers should be aware of the gamut of existing models and
tools in the shipping industry and other related sectors. Events and causal factor
charts are very helpful, but usually the skeleton changes until the maximum
information is gathered on the security incident and the chart is fully completed and
up dated.
Thus, a chart on the management systems investigated at all management
level after a maritime crime or any maritime security incident occurred is provided in
Annex Q. It highlights all levels of responsibilities involved in case of an event or
incident and provides a clear picture of the scene to be scrutinized.
229

See Proshanto K. Mukherjee and Max Mejia Jr. , “Selected issues of law and ergonomics in maritime
security”, Journal of International Maritime Law, Vol.10, No.4, August- September 2004, at p.323. The
authors highlight the various changes that affect the international regimes for maritime security as well as
several new initiatives which should be considered by policy makers and legislators when transforming
international instruments into domestic law. The legal frame work on the subject falling under public
international law, regulatory and criminal law should be carefully reviewed to find out the most appropriate
countermeasures to reduce or eliminate the existing grey areas and deficiencies found in the existing
instruments. A revision of UNCLOS 82 which may act as an umbrella is suggested by the authors. This
approach in the long term will encourage transparency, efficiency, effectiveness and good governance.
230
See BIMCO, “Stowaways”, BIMCO Bulletin, Vol.102, No.3, June 200, at p.91.
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Finally, policy makers, legislators and maritime security investigators should
use the SecInciMap as a powerful tool which may assist in drafting legislation or
preparing reports to correct the deficiencies found in the complete in-depth study of
the considered case or scenario 231 .
The recommended practices for assisting policy makers or investigators in
cases of maritime security incidents (minor, moderate or major) may be summarized
as follows 232 :
1. Receive the complete report of the maritime security incident or final
judgment of the case (trial);
2. Organize the incident data, witnesses, newspapers, literature, other reports
and information, etc.;
3. Identify and confirm the validity of the deterrent factors related to the
criminal intent as well as the active and latent conditions that allowed the
maritime security incident to occur;
4. Develop a vertical, macro-level analysis of the maritime security incident by
using a top down approach as mentioned in Figure 13;
5. Illustrate the flow of events and acts;
6. Use the conventional symbols to illustrate deterrent factors, active and latent
conditions, primary and secondary events, etc.;
7. Construct the MarCrimInciMap/SecInciMap;
8. Make the first assessment and review the findings;
9. Review the SecInciMap and do a second assessment to confirm all deterrent
factors contributing to the criminal intent and check the latent and active
conditions found through the interpretation of the Map;
10. Establish the final report on the assessed case or maritime security incident
by describing each step and summarize the findings;
11. Provide to the interested parties the lessons to be learned after the in-depth
study of this maritime security incident;
12. Furnish all details and the complete report to the Maritime Training Institutes
and Universities to be transmitted to all maritime students and professionals
the lessons to be learned to avoid such incidents from occurring again;
13. Provide all shipping companies, ports and ships entitled to fly the flag of the
country with the findings and recommendations;
14. Finally, review the existing laws relating to this maritime security incident,
and if necessary propose amendments or any other equivalent proactive
measures to eliminate or reduce such threats.
231

See Theodore Sampson, Maritime Risk Analysis and Management: existing practices, existing needs,
LUCRAM, Lund: Lund University Centre for Risk Analysis and Management (LUCRAM), 2002.
232
Supra, footnote 224 at p.67. Mejia describes all steps and approaches to be implemented to obtain a
preliminary and subsequently a final assessment of the maritime security incident by using correctly the
SecInciMap and to deduct all factors which contributed to the occurrence of the event.
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Top down
approach

Figure 13:

Law and ergonomics- ISPS Code: new perspectives to investigate criminal intents

Figure 13 highlights the usefulness of a top down approach in searching the failures.

4.4

The response of the shipping and port industries and other
stakeholders
Morocco remains a source of stowaways and high risk zone for contraband

goods and smuggling of drugs, whereas, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania are areas
affected by migrant stowaways. Since the recent past, these areas have been
threatened by new drug routes used by transnational organized gangs with
international ramifications. Contraband in this region is very popular and policy
makers or legislators face serious issues due to the tolerance of the black markets by
authorities, highlighting the complexity of the problem, which is increasing
according to Europol’s latest report in 2007 233 on the subject. Another point to be
considered is that many stowaways migrate to other countries before boarding oceangoing vessels to Europe or destinations as far as the North American continent.

233

See “EU organized Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA)”, 2007, Europol, The Hague: Europol, 2007,
< www.europol.europa.eu >, (July, 2007). Also, the Annual Report 2006, Europol is relevant regarding
these threats menacing the two sides of the Mediterranean Sea. See also WCO’s reports on drugs offences.
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Policy makers and all parties involved in the maritime adventure trading in or out the
Maghreb Region should be aware of this information provided by international
organizations or agencies, giving the latest trends and data on the subject. On board
commercial vessels, it is crucial that crews are familiar with IMO’s guidelines on
stowaways and illegal migrants by sea, drugs and other crimes considered as
maritime crimes. When, the stowaways are found hidden onboard vessels, masters
have to inform immediately their owners and operators, P& I Clubs and document all
actions carefully for further investigation reports or inspections. Human rights must
be preserved as well as fair treatment 234 . P& I Clubs have the expertise on
repatriation 235 , but recently IMO has established the Stowaway Focal Point, the
object of which is to manage the reports and data on the subject by assisting in
repatriation issues as well as disembarkation of stowaways, facilitation of diplomatic
responses to resolve stowaway cases when restrained on board vessels or detained, to
promote security awareness among all actors involved in the shipping business, and
to consider the claims of other parties directly or indirectly affected by the menace.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the risks of stowaways, smuggling of
drugs and contraband issues are high in the Maghreb region, therefore policy makers
of those involved States, should reinforce and strengthen controls and preventive
measures in their ports as mandated by the ISPS Code. Particular emphasis should be
placed on port security and port facilities assessment to enhance the standards
adopted and required by IMO and the internationally agreed principles on the subject.
Waterfronts, accesses to the infrastructures or adjacent areas, corruption issues, false
documents and other related sensitive matters should be reconsidered and reassessed
according to the available statistics and trends.
234

See Ernie Forster, “Unwanted guests that can cause a host of troubles”, Lloyd’s List, (June 9, 2006). The
recent incident in Durban in South Africa highlighted the difficulties faced by the shipping industry when
the master and three crew members were arrested and prosecuted under culpable homicide. After
considerable debate, at the end they were heavily fined and received suspended prison sentences. In this
episode, the master and crew failed to declare to the owner their presence on board the ship and were
friendly to them, allowing them to climb down a rope to swim to the nearest quay. However, two of the
seven drowned and the survivors declared to the authorities that they had been forced off the ship.
235
See Sam Ignarsky, “Home Office could tap into P & I expertise on repatriation”, Lloyd’s List,
(May 17, 2006).
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Thus, ensuring an effective, coherent and humane response to all these threats
remains a major challenge to these concerned States and their policy makers as well
as to the shipping industry and its stakeholders. Prevention, cooperation, discipline
and order at sea, proactive measures and other solutions should be encouraged at all
levels by providing rights to victims, reinforcing border controls as well as water
patrols, and giving all possible means to the relevant actors including ports, police,
customs, coast guards, navies and intelligence services to counter this menace by
promoting efficiency, effectiveness and awareness. Investigation, prosecution and
procedural measures and procedures should be reviewed to determine the most
appropriate barriers to protect all interests involved in the system, thus enhancing sea
trade and commerce in general.
The shipping industry should be aware of the relevant provisions of the UN
Vienna Convention, 1988, particularly articles 17, §3 and 4 under which according to
the existing agreements or arrangements between those Parties, the flag State may
authorize the requesting State to “board the vessel, search the vessel or if evidence of
involvement in illicit traffic is found, take appropriate action with respect to the
vessel, persons and cargo on board”. Therefore, shipping companies should provide
masters and crew on board their ships all documents 236 related to drug smuggling,
contraband and other related offences, and establish clear procedures to deal with
such security incidents in the case of an event ensuring that audits are carried out and
the overall process is monitored and controlled according to the requirements of the
ISM and ISPS Codes. The designated person ashore and the CSO should be held
236

IMO/ILO guidelines should be provided for all crew members before the ship leaves port and to
seafarers training centres as pedagogic support to familiarize and train mariners in combating such threats
by using all available legal instruments and guidelines to enhance maritime security awareness. See
“Stowaways and refugees”, BIMCO, (August 1, 2007). The author highlights causes, such as the great
divisions between the poor and rich countries, the growing sense of desperation while legal migration is
increasingly tightened and monitored. Thus, numerous stowaways have died after they had hidden
themselves in dangerous places on board vessels, such as in containers or ship’s holds without ventilation,
ending in tragic and dramatic conclusions. The shipping industry is very involved in these sensible issues as
it was mentioned by the BIMCO author, because ships are used as a means of escape from misery and
unemployment by desperate people from different nationalities and continents, risking their lives for a
better future. Also, the urgent need to assist these wretched people and to put them in a safe haven or place
with regard to human fundamental rights, interception issues and safety concerns are highlighted. Charter
party consequences of maritime security initiatives should be considered, <http://www.bimco.org/>, 2007.

73

responsible for any breach or misconduct in improving or surveying the
implementation processes according to the regulations and rules stipulated by
international instruments and national law. Seafarers and all personnel from ports
and related activities should be given guidance on how to use efficiently and
effectively the related guidelines and instructions given by the authorities and
companies on the subject.
The security of maritime cargo and, in particular, containerized maritime
cargo, poses challenges from both the legislative and technical viewpoints. All
parties involved should be also aware of this issue 237 . Close cooperation between
shipping companies, masters and crews, police, customs, coast guards and other
related security agencies should be encouraged to tackle this issue. The use of
BIMCO 238 documents and instructions to guide ships in cases of stowaway threats or
drugs on board may assist the parties in dealing with these offences. ITF
procedures 239 , marine insurance companies’ rules, the reports of maritime security
agencies and organizations, P & I Clubs’ special circulars and recommendations are
also very helpful for providing excellent guidance to shipowners, crews and other
involved parties. The Master’s handbook on ship’s business 240 is a powerful tool to
assist masters in dealing with hostile and unauthorized boarders, as well as drug
abuse and trafficking, smuggling and the duty to render aid at sea 241 . The shipping
237

See UK P & I Club on crime watch, cargo claims, stowaways , charter parties claims and good practices
< http://www.ukpandi.com/ >, (August 8, 2007).
238
See BIMCO advices, special circulars, instructions and its anti- drug clauses, ISPS/MTSA Clauses,
stowaway clauses and smuggling clauses (BOXTIME Charter Party) etc., < http://www.bimco.org >,
(August2, 2007). Restricted areas are described as well as the costs suffered by industry and the urgent need
for cooperation between shipowners and authorities to reduce delays, costs and high penalties to ease the
shipowner’s unfair burden. Preventive measures to tackle drug issues should be implemented on board
vessels while in port, including the monitoring of crew, vessel search procedures, the discover of drugs and
those related to combat the stowaway threats and related precautions should be observed.
239
See ITF policy on stowaways, as adopted by the ITF Seafarer’s Section Conference, Singapore, 8-10
October 1997. Clear guidance is provided on how to deal with stowaways’ issues and efforts to be made to
disembark the stowaway in the next first port of destination, fair treatment, care and checks to be done.
< http://www.itfglobal.org/files/seealsodocs/453/Stowaways.pdf>, (August 2, 2007).
240
See Tuuli Anna Messer, Master’s handbook on ship’s business, 3rd ed., Centreville (Maryland): Cornel
Maritime Press, 2001 at pp.4, 10, 22,26,42,54,100 and pp.101 to 111.
241
See the MV Clementine Maersk Case (2005). The Captain of the containership has been blamed and
criticized in the tabloid press for bringing 27 refugees who were rescued in the Mediterranean Sea, near
Sicily to the UK. This case highlights the conflicts and pressure faced by a master in such a situation.
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industry should encourage masters in using all the valuable and useful manuals or
handbooks when confronted with such threats 242 .

4.5

The Danish and Swedish experience
As mentioned by Sjöberg

243

, all governmental agencies involved in

combating stowaways, smuggling of drugs and contraband by sea are working
closely to tackle these issues. Their main strengths include security information;
communication and cooperation between the different actors, such as police, customs
and coast guards. They use an integrated network system where particular
information and specific trends are surveyed 24hours a day, and exchanges among
them are done regularly and assessed continuously. The findings are intelligence
based. In Sweden, stowaway threats are presumed to be non-existent, but drug
offences and contraband issues are high risks which are threatening many particular
regions in that country. Transnational and organized violent crimes are major issues
of concerns in this region; but no maritime terrorist activities have been reported in
this part of the world. Nevertheless, the data and statistics must be interpreted
carefully because there is a direct link between international terrorism and organized
crime which share similar features. Cooperation between agencies is the most
important aspect highlighted by the interlocutor. The first details of a maritime crime
are analyzed carefully and interpreted by different agencies. Then, the final results
are communicated, exchanged and reviewed. Training of all people involved in the
maritime security field as well as exercises and drills are extremely important factors,
242

See Nautical Institute, “The Master’s role in collecting evidence”, London: The Nautical Institute, 1989.
Also, The Shipmaster’s Security Manual, BIMCO, 1998. Preventive measures and remedies for drug
smuggling, piracy and stowaways are provided in this manual, < http://www.bimco.org/ >, (May 8, 2007).
243
Björn Sjöberg, Senior Intelligence Officer from the Swedish Customs and specialized in law
enforcement was interviewed by the writer several hours. As well, port authorities and VTS managers of
Malmö port, police and coast guards officers to share the experience and views with regard to the threats
described in this dissertation. The main findings and exchanges dwelled on lessons learned by experience
and the use of theoretical and operational approaches regarding possible countermeasures or solutions to be
implemented to combat and eliminate the menace, its root causes and consequences, the vulnerability,
concepts utilized to enforce their laws and mitigation measures in Sweden. Also, a general discussion on
appropriate approaches to be implemented regarding the organized crime and its relation with the other
threats was held which allowed the writer to confirm certain findings on the subject which encouraged him
to carry out an in-depth analysis of the subject.
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contributing to the success of the enforcement agency.

The writer suggested

focusing more on preventive than remedial measures. Screening was mentioned but
not considered to be as important as information. During the discussion it was
acknowledged that routine work could be a serious impediment to carrying out
proper and reviewing the safety and security tasks. Finally, a regional approach and
cooperation was considered to be encouraged to combat and eliminate the risks
associated with such threats. Notably, the stowaways and drug related offences are
treated by the Danish Maritime Authority under its technical regulations 244 for inter
alia, fixing the type of offences and their punishments, including fines and
supplementary fines if necessary, and the duration of imprisonment. Some sanctions
related to stowaways provide for a maximum term of one year, but for special cases
2 years’ imprisonment plus supplementary fines may be imposed. Sweden imposes
similar sanctions as Denmark with respect to these crimes or offences 245 . The
sanctions and preventive measures are important features for such considered
offences. Thus, the same conclusions have been found by comparing these two
countries which share considerable similarities with respect to these threats and the
countermeasures implemented to combat them.

4.6

Maghreb Policies: new countermeasures and challenges
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the Mediterranean is the main

gateway for stowaway threats as well as illegal immigrants into Europe. The
Maghreb region is on the forefront regarding these threats. The problems associated
with attempted stowaways, stowaways, asylum seekers, illegal immigration,
smuggling of drugs by sea and contraband goods at Mediterranean borders are
matters of common concern for the entire Maghreb States and the European Union.
244

See the Danish Maritime Authority’s Technical Regulation No.5 of 19 May 2003 fixing all modalities ,
preventive measures, treatment of the stowaway, notification procedures, sanctions, fines and imprisonment
depending on the case from 1 year max to 2 years according to the nature and form of the offence, age of
the stowaway etc.;
245
See “The Swedish Club” for advice to masters and drug smuggling warnings as well as the statistics for
claims reported and analyzed by the Club.
<http://www.swedishclub.com/tm_loss_prevention/advice_to_masters_2005/Advice_to_masters.htm#Drug
smuggling warning >, (August 5, 2007).
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The management of these threats is the responsibility of each State, but preventive
and remedial measures are not enough to cease or stop the wave of stowaways and
other related issues. Cooperation based on a regional approach and assisting States in
the implementation process is vital to ensure that new standards are adopted on a
wider scale. Policy makers should think carefully when enforcement regimes or
amendments have to be implemented into national law.
As pointed out by Mejia and Mukherjee 246 , the spectrum of violent maritime
criminal acts, illustrates increasing levels of sophistication in planning and violence
in execution, but decreasing frequency of occurrence. However, stowaways and
attempted stowaways, smuggling drugs or contraband goods are increasing in
frequency of occurrence, because the sanctions are inadequate, the punishments and
incentives are insufficient, and the unwillingness of society to pay the price related to
these threats. Safety and security measures involve huge costs and their impacts and
the results can be observed only in the long term. Policy makers in the Maghreb
region should consider carefully the SUA 2005 Convention and analyze in- depth the
pros and cons to determine whether or not to ratify it and its Protocol of 2005.
Mukherjee has reviewed all aspects related to the SUA Convention 2005 and stated
that the list of unlawful acts has been broadened in the 2005 Protocol, meaning that
the scope of offences is wider than those stipulated in SUA 88. New provisions on
boarding have been added and when clear grounds exist, and the conditions are
fulfilled, the ship flying the flag of another State Party may be boarded by its
forces 247 .
Policy makers and practitioners need to develop a comprehensive
understanding of the multi-dimensional phenomenon of illegal migration and
stowaways in order to manage it effectively. Thus, it is important when drafting
legislation to make the distinction between people smuggling and trafficking of
human being. Furthermore, clear definitions should be provided and punishments
246

Supra, footnote 223 at p.66. The authors have done a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the SUA
2005 Convention.
247
Ibid. see article 3 and 8 bis of the SUA 2005 Convention.
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must be drafted accordingly. The half-way house doctrine is a balanced way to
ensure a middle approach between mens rea offences and strict liability offences
when sanctions are decided regarding the different threats, but before putting them
into force. All interests, such as public welfare, good governance, and national goals
etc., must be taken into account by legislators and policy makers to avoid excessive
or diminished punishments accorded to the degree, nature and form of that offence.
In summary, the efficient level of deterrence is important to determine the marginal
social benefit of crime reduction. It is thus vital and valuable to appreciate and
predict the effects of rules designed policy makers and legislators when drafting
legislation. A criminal commits a crime if the expected benefit is greater than the
expected punishment, hence, policy makers should be aware of the concepts of law
and economics which should be applied when adopting legislation for dealing with
maritime crimes. However, clear definitions on maritime crimes are needed and a net
separation in the legislation between attempted stowaways, stowaways, asylum
seekers, fortune seekers and refugees must be made when drafting the offences and
related sanctions into national law according to the existing international instruments.
The effects as well as a clear understanding of enforcement regimes and how well
enforced the regulations are, is an important task for legislators and policy makers in
the Maghreb region. The main objectives of law and economics 248 are to profile the
legal rules to be used to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in the system, as
highlighted in Figure 14. It exposes the different avenues exploited by stowaways
and the associated issues of repatriation, detention, expulsion and retention.
Particular legal regimes which have been described in the previous chapters prevail
concerning refugees, asylum seekers or statelessness stowaways or illegal migrants
rescued at sea. Criminal acts or criminals and organized crime members as well as
related matters fall under the criminal law regimes in the State where the offence has
been committed and also depend on the existing accords between the sending and
receiving countries.

248

See Paul S. Dempsey and William E. Thoms, Law and Economic Regulation in Transportation, London:
Quorum Books, 1986, at pp.1-43.
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Figure 14:

Flow chart of transportation of stowaway or asylum seeker or refugee cases
and their associated issues

In most cases as described in the flow chart above, stowaways as fortune
seekers or asylum seekers or refugees are repatriated 249 to their countries of origin
after detention on board the ship or in special designated centers for irregular
immigrants, such as those existing in France or Spain, when the authorization of
residency is denied. Various complex related issues need further research studies.
The following chapter will expose the reader to the major findings of the
research carried out in connection with this dissertation, the conclusions reached and
proposals offered as policy recommendations to legislators and policy makers as a
final pronouncement on these sensitive subjects.
249

Repatriation from the late Latin “repatriatus” means to return to the country of origin. Whereas,
detention is related to the state of being detained for trial or a period of temporary custody prior to such trial
of the offender according to the existing national legal regime. The word “expulsion” means the act of
forcing out someone from a State or forced return. It is important to highlight the removal measures
occurring at the external border of a State, such as the “refoulement” of an offender from a country, because
he does not fulfill the legal conditions for entry into that State. A clear distinction is to be made with
“deportation”, which occurs when a report is made of an offence related to the residency status of the
offender on the territory of a State. Expulsion for illegal residency covers numerous issues, such as illegal
entry, refusal of renewal of a permit or visa, expulsion for reasons of public order, etc.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
“Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered.”Aristotle, Greek critic, philosopher and physicist, 384 BC-322 BC

5.1

Conclusions
This dissertation has attempted to steer the reader through the past and

contemporary legal and policy issues relating to the transportation of stowaways,
drugs and contraband goods by sea from the Maghreb region. It has highlighted the
grey areas and gaps prevailing in the existing international legal regimes and national
legislation. Great emphasis has been placed on the policy and security management
processes. The enforcement mechanisms and the countermeasures and practices used
by the shipping industry and stakeholders to combat and eliminate this perennial
cancer with its malignancy and gangrening have been discussed. The research has
revealed that the gross inadequacy of the enforcement system has detrimentally
affected sea trade and international commerce.
The objective of this dissertation was to undertake a critical review of those
threats and to attempt to provide answers to the burning questions of the adequacy of
the current international regimes. The relevance of IMO guidelines and instruments
has also been critically examined. In pursuance of this stated objective, the existing
policies of the Maghreb States with respect to this menace and the strategies
employed to counter the scourge have been identified and analysed. The study has
revealed certain trends which are supported by statistical data and numerous other
factors and conditions confirming the persistency of this menace.
Contemporary security events have in recent times culminated in the adoption
of various legal instruments such as the ISPS Code, dealing with maritime security
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issues at both national and international levels, and numerous mechanisms have been
put into place to raise security deterrence levels. Even so, this study shows that
despite those measures the incidence of these threats have greatly increased in the
Maghreb region. This could be attributed to the porous borders and the culture of
“laissez faire”. Recent security incidents have illustrated the inadequacies of the
existing legal regimes and their enforcement mechanisms. These are attributable to,
inter alia, persistent discrepancies with respect to precise definitions, gaps and
overlapping matters existing in various international instruments, such as the lack of
definitions of maritime crime, terrorism and maritime terrorism at both national and
international levels. IMO guidelines on illegal migrants rescued at sea and other
associated issues have increased the scope of offences and have perplexed policy
makers in their efforts to find appropriate sanctions. This lack of harmonization and
unification of laws governing the distinction between crimes and non-mens rea
offences in the existing penal regimes of Maghreb States, result in inadequate
sanctions in the prosecution of the offenders, because the notion of maritime crime is
perceived differently by those States. This also has a bearing on jurisdictional issues
such as the enforcement regimes of coastal States regarding maritime crimes
occurring in the contiguous zone. UNCLOS 82 considers only three maritime violent
acts, piracy, slavery and drug offences; its scope is thus too narrow.
These illegal activities are now controlled by transnational organized crime
syndicates employing new means such as technology, and given the huge fortunes
involved in this illegal trade, they impede the effectiveness and efficiency of
responses from government enforcement agencies. This research work has also
brought to light the main causes and potential consequences of stowaway threats and
the pull and push factors. These crimes are facilitated by poor socio-economic
conditions and unstable political and cultural situations prevailing in this region,
inducing more candidates to this dangerous adventure. The weakest link in the
security chain is port facilities which facilitate easy access to sensitive information
related to ships and port facilities.
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The study has revealed that the most common type of stowaways is fortune
seekers and potential refugees. As a result of stowaways on board ships, shipowners
and ship operators face serious consequences. This multi faceted problem warrants a
complete reassessment of maritime security risks and vulnerabilities through
reviewing of the overall security risk management process.

Events have

demonstrated time and again that if a maritime crime or security event occurs and is
not managed appropriately, the causes will not be revealed and the objectives
promulgated through IMO instruments will not be attained. This dissertation has also
explained the usefulness of the continuum and spectrum of maritime crimes as well
as the SecInciMap through which the associated consequences, latent and active
conditions and deterrent factors and levels of responsibilities arising out of a security
incident can be determined and explained. In addition, it has revealed that the
preventive measures are the most important to be considered by policy makers to
reduce or eliminate the risks of such occurrences, whereas remedial measures
mitigate their effects and are the last barrier of the security system.
The international legal regimes do not tackle the problem in its totality. The
appropriate examples falling under this scope are the SUA 2005 Convention and
related instruments where definitions and technical aspects are still controversial
issues and barriers for their ratification. In this perspective criminalization and unfair
treatment of seafarers in cases of maritime security incidents are issues which need
more in-depth analysis and consideration from policy makers and legislators. It could
be deduced that stowaway threats, contraband goods and smuggling of drugs share
similar salient features regarding their root causes and potential consequences. Also,
these sensitive issues which were considered by the views of various scholars, legal
instruments and the open literature are still controversial and open to debate. As such,
an ill-advised reader or policy maker may be easily trapped by the complexity in
differentiation or categorization of such offences in terms of determining the most
appropriate sanctions according to their forms, nature and scale. Consequently, this
research has highlighted the utility of flow charts or appropriate maps which can
guide policy makers. The use of the half way house concept to find an intermediate
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solution to determine sanctions is aptly illustrated. The interviews conducted in the
course of the research brought to light the main maritime security components for
effectively countering security threats, including the flow of sensitive security
information, intelligence, and communication, efficient general risk management
process, reporting culture and security awareness.

5.2

Recommendations
As global sea trade and the world economy keep on growing by leaps and

bounds, there will be a boost in containerization of carriage of goods by sea with
concomitant increase in modernization of port facilities and related infrastructures in
the Maghreb region to respond to changing demands. Container security threats, the
phenomenon of stowaways, smuggling of drugs and contraband goods will grow in
parallel with these developments. In addition, persistent disparities between the
general living standards of people in the Maghreb and Africa and those in the
developed world will be an impetus for massive illegal migration towards the
industrialized world, creating opportunities for organized transnational crime
syndicates or cartels to exploit the weaknesses generated by lack of enforcement
regimes and poor decision-making at all levels. In this regard, there is an urgent need
to decisively tackle the root causes, such as unemployment, drug culture and
narcotics trafficking in the Maghreb and other parts of Africa, famine and ethnic
conflicts. The deculturization of people groups, massive displacement of people, high
costs of living and the aspirations for better life are contributing factors to all these
threats.

5.2.1 International legal instruments
To provide the basis for them to act, there is an urgent need for Maghreb
States to accede to and transform the provisions of SUA 2005 Convention and its
Protocol of 2005 into their national legislation. They can then board suspicious ships
and prosecute offenders in accordance with those legal instruments. IMO guidelines
and recommendations on maritime security should be considered when drafting
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legislation and amending existing instruments. There are clear grounds for adopting
appropriate and precise definitions of “maritime crime” and “maritime terrorism”.
None of the international legal instruments dealing with these issues adequately
define these concepts; consequently, this hampers decisive prosecution of such
threats. As the scope of such offences is narrow in most of the existing instruments,
for example, the SUA 2005 Convention, there is a need to broaden the scope because
of the emergence of new threats not considered previously by policy makers.
Regional agreements creating stronger legislation for prosecution of maritime crimes
and related non-mens rea offences occurring in the contiguous zone should be
considered. Since a security system is as strong as its weakest link, a synergistic
approach to global security management is suggested. This calls for closer technical
cooperation and assistance among regional States and the creation of training
opportunities in the maritime security field at all levels. Amendments to UNCLOS
82 provisions are suggested to broaden the scope of States’ jurisdictions over violent
maritime acts and offences.
In addition, to effectively and efficiently combat the menace, Maghreb States
should give effect to the provisions of the UN Convention on Transnational
Organized Crime of 2000 and its Protocols of 2000, and UN Convention against
Corruption of 2000 and the Drug Control Treaties and related resolutions into their
national laws. IMO could provide a maritime criminal code, based on the same
approach as for the ISM or ISPS Codes, where all these offences are precisely and
concisely defined and categorized, and related sanctions are prescribed. This
possibility may encourage new proactive maritime security measures and create a
security awareness culture among member States.

5.2.2 Maghreb security policies
The Maghreb States should adopt new security strategies to counter this
menace by promoting security awareness and implementing recently developed
concepts and methods, such as the SecInciMap or MarCrimMap. Policy makers
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should consider reviewing all security risk management processes used for the
implementation of the ISM and ISPS Codes. Particular emphasis should be placed on
preventive and remedial measures to encourage prevention, deterrence and
mitigation. Strengthened control measures and additional internal and external audits
may diminish the risks of errors or failures. The restricted access to sensitive
information should be reinforced by increasing controls and surveillance at all
management levels in the organizational structure.
5.2.3 New maritime security perspectives for the shipping industry
Provisions dealing with seafarers’ rights, duties and responsibilities linked to
maritime security issues to prevent unfair and unjustified criminalization of masters
and crew should be enforced. The views of experts in the shipping industry,
stakeholders and academics should be taken into account by senior management.
The following broad outline of policy is suggested:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

A broadened security agenda to combat these threats.
Negotiation of agreements to be encouraged at all levels.
Integration of the issue of stowaways in the national strategies of reduction of
poverty, unemployment and other related root causes.
Elaboration of common and harmonized policies at all levels, national and
regional.
Implementation of stowaways, drugs/narcotics, smuggling and trafficking,
and contraband goods observatories or survey centers, and endow them with
forecasting and alert instruments. In addition, data, statistics, trends and
reports by security agencies or designated bodies in charge of surveys should
be provided.
Institution of stronger laws and penalties to raise the risk of participating in
contraband markets and laissez faire.
The expansion of auditing and verification procedures to all parties involved
and systems to increase the risk of detection at all levels in the organizational
system.

Finally, this study highlights the need for further research work to be encouraged
by the threatened countries themselves. Thus, accurate data, statistics and trends
must be provided by them and reported to the designated international organizations
to obtain, in the long term, the real impacts of such security measures and policies in
the maritime security domain.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Map of the Maghreb States

Source: The Maghreb Review, quarterly journal on the Maghreb, <http://www.maghrebreview.com>,
(May, 2007).

* The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) includes the following countries: Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and the Western Sahara region. The Maghreb
States are situated in the highlighted yellow areas on the map.
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Appendix B
Impacts of the Phoenician trade route in the Maghreb Region

Triangle
Gibraltar –Corsica - Malta

Zone

2
3
1

Source: Map of Trade routes used by the Phoenicians – 1200BC, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
< http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/9c/PhoenicianTrade.png >, (May 31, 2007).

* Main zones of trade routes reported for North Africa: from Carthage to Tangier
•

Zone 1 : Straight of Gibraltar & Baleares

•

Zone 2 : Sardinia & Corsica

•

Zone 3 : Sicily & Isle Lampedusa & Malta

Maritime activities occurred between these different geographical localities
involving trade, flows and displacement of population, associated with various
tragedies. Similarly, in 2007, the same movements and trends are observed according
to IOM 250 in view of the latest reports published on the subject.
250

See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Migration Initiatives 2007, Report, (Geneva: IOM,
January, 2007), at pp. 23-26. Recognizing that the Migration as a key global phenomenon, needing various
approaches to tackle in depth the related issues to be addressed by policy makers in the threatened regions.
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Appendix C
Statistics on Stowaways – Maghreb (IMO)

The following graphs and charts provided in the Annexes C, D and E are
based on the data published by the Facilitation Committee of IMO and
communicated to all member States. < www.imo.org >, (July, 2007).
The main documents used are:
1. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the year 2000,
IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.71, 7 January 2002
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D4507/71.pdf >

2. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the years 2001
and 2002, IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.77, 20 January 2003
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D6616/77.pdf >

3. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the years 2002
and 2003, IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.83, 12 July 2004
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D9676/83.pdf >

4. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the years 2003
and 2004, IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.89, 3 June 2005
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14994/89.pdf >

5. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the year 2005,
IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.95, 30 June 2006
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14847/95.pdf >

6. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – Annual Statistics for the year 2006,
IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.102, 17 January 2007
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D17422/102.pdf >

7. Reports on Stowaway Incidents – (January to April 2007)
IMO – FAL.2 / Circ.103, 24 April 2007
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D18743/103.pdf >
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Statistics on Stowaways – Maghreb (IMO)

Stowaway Statistics (IMO)- Maghreb,from 2001-April 2007
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Stowaway Statistics (IMO) - Maghreb: from 2001 to April 2007
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Annual Statistics: Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea from the Maghreb
Source: IMO, MSC.3/Circ.10,Add.1, Unsafe Practices associated with Trafficking or Transport of
Migrants by Sea, (28 March 2006), at p.6 and MSC.3/Circ.12, (29 January 2007). <www.imo.org>.
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Statistics on Stowaways and Ports of destination
in the Maghreb region

Annual Stowaway Statistics by Region (IMO),2001-April 2007
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Annual Stowaway Statistics by Region (IMO) – Worldwide
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Appendix D
Maghreb Stowaway Statistics

Number of Stowaways by
State

Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO), 2001-April 2007
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Annual Stowaway Statistics by Maghreb State, place of embarkation
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Appendix E
Stowaway Statistics by ports – Maghreb Countries

Annual Stowaway Statistics (IMO), Algeria-main ports
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Stowaway Statistics by ports in Algeria: from 2001 to April 2007

Annual Stowaway Statistics(IMO)- Morocco main ports,
2001- April 2007
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Appendix F
Stowaways and attempted Stowaways Statistics,
Algeria-Year 2006
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Source: Direction de la Marine Marchande (DMM), “Annual Statistics- 2006”, Ministry of Transport
– Algeria, < http://www.ministere-transports.gov.dz/>, (July, 2007).
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Appendix G
Stowaway Problem Areas – Africa
Long - term: (1989-2007)

Morocco

Algeria

Map of Stowaway problem areas-2007 (Africa)
Source: Robmarine Online services, <http://www.robmarine.com/indexe.html >, (July, 2007).

Africa remains the largest source of stowaway activity and in particularly
Morocco, followed by Algeria regarding the Maghreb region. In accordance with
demands for stowaway related information from P&I clubs, the IMO and the ICS, the
latest stowaway data, maps and news on the affected areas have been analyzed by
Robmarine services.

For Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, no accurate data are

available.
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Appendix H
Maritime Crime Triangle & Cycle

© Copyright Semir Tarek Maksen, 2007

The Maritime Crime Triangle and Cycle using Ergonomics -Economics
Theories & Law

•
This triangle is based on the theory of Crime Triangle and has been
adapted to the Maritime Crime in considering Ergonomics and Economics
Principles & Law in case of an incident.
Elements of the Crime Triangle

Strategy

Opportunity to commit the offence – The
Victim

Increase the risk of apprehensions

Ability to commit the offence

Increase the effort required to commit the offence

Desire to commit the offence

Reduce the rewards available to the offender

Source: < http://www.police.qld.gov.au/Regional+Policing/metroNorth/robbery/triangle.htm >
(July, 2007)
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Appendix I
The Drug trade in the Maghreb region

The Drug trade and routes in the Maghreb Region in 2007
Source: “Reports of the National Gendarmerie in Algeria regarding the drugs trade and quantity
confiscated in 2006-April 2007”, published in the national newspaper Liberté, April 30, 2007,
< http://www.liberte-algerie.com/ >, (June, 2007).

Map of the world use of cannabis (kif) – UNODC- World Drug report 2007
Source: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2007,
(Vienna: UNODC, United Nations Publications),
< http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/world_drug_report.html >, (July, 2007).
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Appendix J
Status Conventions – Maghreb States (IMO)

X: accession; d: denunciation

Status of Conventions (IMO) – Maghreb States – June 2007
Source: IMO, “Status of Conventions by country”,
< http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D19160/status.xls >, (July 10, 2007).
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Appendix K
IMO Resolutions-Maritime Security
A.584 (14)

Measures to prevent unlawful acts

A.738 (18)

Measures to prevent and suppress piracy/armed robbery against ships

A.773 (18)

Enhancement of Safety of Life at Sea by the Prevention and Suppression of
Unsafe Practices associated with alien smuggling by ships

A.867 (20)

Combating unsafe practices associated with the trafficking of transport of
migrants by sea

A.871 (20)

Guidelines on the Allocation of Responsibilities to Seek the Successful
Resolution of Stowaway Cases

A.872 (20)

Guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of drugs,
psychotropic substances and precursor chemical on ships engaged in
international maritime traffic

MSC/Circ.896/Rev.1 Interim measures for combating unsafe practices associated with the
trafficking or transport of migrants by sea
A. 920 (22)

Review of safety measures and procedures for the treatment of persons
rescued at sea

A. 922 (22)

Code of practice for the investigation of the crimes of piracy and armed
robbery against ship

A. 923 (22)

Measures to prevent the registration of phantom ships

A. 924 (22)

Review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which
threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships

FAL.7 (29)

Adopted on 10 January 2002.Adoption of amendments to the Convention on
facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965, as amended

MSC.167 (78) Guidelines on the treatment of persons rescued at sea
MSC/Circ.443 Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews onboard
ships
Revised MSC/Circ. 622 Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing
piracy and armed robbery against ships
Revised MSC/Circ.623 Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews
on preventing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships
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MSC/Circ. 113

Guidance to masters, companies and duly authorized officers on the
requirements relating to the submission of security related information
prior to the entry of a ship into port

MSC/Circ. 1131 Interim guidance on voluntary self-assessment by SOLAS Contracting
Governments and by port facilities
MSC/Circ. 1132 Guidance relating to the implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the
ISPS Code
MSC/Circ. 1133

Reminder of the obligation to notify flag States when exercising control
and compliance measures

MSC/Circ. 1067 Early implementation of measures to enhance maritime security
MSC/Circ. 1072 Guidance on provision of ship security alert systems
MSC/Circ. 1073

Measures to enhance maritime security- Directives for Maritime Rescue
Co-ordination Centres (MRCCS) on acts of violence against ships

MSC/Circ. 1074 Measures to enhance maritime security. Interim guidelines for the
authorization of Recognized Security Organizations (RSO) acting on
behalf of the Administration and/or designated authority of a Contracting
Government
MSC/Circ. 1097 Guidance relating to the implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2
and the ISPS Code
MSC/Circ. 1111 Guidance relating to the implementation of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the
ISPS Code
MSC/Circ. 1112 Shore leave and access to ships under the ISPS Code
MSC/Circ. 1154 Guidelines on training and certification for company security officers
MSC/Circ. 1155 Guidance on the message priority and the testing of ship security alert
system
MSC/Circ. 1156 Guidance on the access of public authorities, emergency response services
and pilots on board ships to which SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS
Code apply
MSC/Circ. 1157 Interim scheme for the compliance of certain cargo ships with the special
measures to enhance maritime security
MSC/Circ. 1188 Guidelines on training and certification for port facility security officers
MSC/Circ. 1193 Guidance on voluntary self-assessment by Administration and for ship
security
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MSC/Circ. 1194 Effective implementation of Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code
MSC/Circ. 1217 Interim guidance on voluntary self-assessment by companies and company
security officers (CSOs) for ship security

UNCLOS 82

Article 98:

Duty to render assistance

1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so
without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of
their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him;
(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and,
where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of
registry and the nearest port at which it will call.
2. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an
adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and,
where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with
neighbouring States for this purpose.
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Appendix L
SUA 88 Convention
Article 3
1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of
intimidation; or
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger
the safe navigation of that ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or
substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its
cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously interferes
with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a
ship; or
(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safe
navigation of a ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted
commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f).
2. Any person also commits an offence if that person:
(a) attempts to commit any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1; or
(b) abets the commission of any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1 perpetrated by
any person or is otherwise an accomplice of a person who commits such an offence;
or
(c) threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national law, aimed at
compelling a physical or juridical person to do or refrain from doing any act, to
commit any of the offences set forth, in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b), (c) and (e),
if that threat is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship in question.
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Appendix M
The Security Incident Map (SecInciMap )

SecInciMap of the Alondra Rainbow Incident
Source: Max Q. Mejia Jr. and Roland Akselsson, ““AcciMapping” Maritime Security Incidents: a
pilot study”, lecture handouts MLP 402, Maritime Law & Policy course, Malmö: WMU, 2007.
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Appendix N
Risk Management Process in a Dynamic Society

Risk management in a dynamic society
Source:

Jens Rasmussen and Inge Svedung, Proactive Risk Management in a Dynamic Society,
Karlstad: Risk center, Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 2000 at p.11.
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Appendix O
The General Security Risk Assessment Process

The General Security Risk Assessment Process Flow Chart

Source: Jens - Uwe Schröder, “An introduction to shipboard security assessment”, in Maximo Q. Mejia
Jr. (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security, a selection of papers and presentations from the
Workshop-Symposium on the Practical Implementation and Critical Evaluation of the ISPS Code 11-15
August 2003 and the International Symposium on Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security 30 August to 1
September 2004, Malmö: WMU, 2005 at p.114.
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Appendix P
Maritime Crime Progression Map

Source: This map was adapted from SecInciMap by Max Q. Mejia Jr., 2007, and
from General Maritime Security Assessment Progress Flow Chart by Jens-Uwe
Schröder, 2003 and from Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents by James
Reason, 1997.
This map presents an overview of the roles of each component of the system
and indicates the flow of events occurring when there is a breakdown of preventive
measures, and that only mitigation measures could attenuate the possible effects on
the system.
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Appendix Q
Investigation of Maritime Crimes / Security Incidents

1. Maritime Crime
or Security
Incident
2.Operational level
Ships-port facilities
Work activities
3. Companies –
Ports Management
level

Government 4
Ports

4. Institutional
Management level

Port facilities
Incident /
Maritime crime

to

Operational level

sl a

2

1

rs

Ships

Society

Le

gi

Policy analysts

3

Companies

Policy makers
Management systems investigated at all management levels after
a maritime crime / security incident occurred
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This chart highlights the different levels involved in the management of
maritime security domain and their interactions with one another. It shows a
hierarchical structure of responsibilities which aids in the identification of areas of
failures in the system.
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